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The Supreme Court’s blockbuster decision in National Federation of
Independent Businesses v. Sebelius1 settled the question of the
constitutionality of President Obama’s health care mandate.2 Four
Supreme Court justices, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts, have now
held that Americans must buy health insurance or pay a federal tax
penalty. The question that next arises is whether Congress can use its
tax power to compel individuals to buy health insurance in fifty separate
state markets each of which is dominated by a monopoly or oligopoly
health care provider.
According to statistics from the Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF) a
single leading insurance provider covered at least half the population in
thirty states (plus the District of Columbia).3 The median market share
of the leading health insurer per state is 54% easily enough to give it
monopoly status. In Indiana, for example, one health insurer covers
84% of the population. In Alabama, a single insurer covers 86%. There
∗ Professor of Law, Northwestern University; Visiting Professor of Law, Yale University;
Visiting Professor of Political Science, Brown University. I am deeply grateful to Gary Lawson for his
extremely helpful comments on an earlier draft. I am also grateful to Larissa Price Leibowitz and to
Abe Salander whose work on these subjects I draw from here. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Larissa
C. Leibowitz, Monopolies and the Constitution: A History of Crony Capitalism, 36 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 983 (2013); Steven G. Calabresi & Abe Salander, Religion and the Equal Protection Clause,
FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013). I am also very grateful to Jason Fried for his splendid work as my
research assistant on this article. Finally, I would like to thank Dan Rodriguez, my Dean at
Northwestern Law School, and John Tomasi, who runs the Political Theory Project at Brown
University, for creating the unique working environment which made it possible for me to write this
article. This article grows out of the William Howard Taft lecture which I gave in 2012 at the
University of Cincinnati College of Law.
1. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
2. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2011).
3. See infra Fig. 1.
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are seventeen states in which a single insurer covers more than 65% of
the population, and there are at least twenty-four states in which one
insurer covers more than 55%. In states where the largest insurer is least
controlling, such as: Wisconsin, Colorado, Missouri, Pennsylvania and
New York, the largest insurers still accounted for between 21% and 34%
of the total population. Even more illustrative of the oligopolistic nature
of the health insurance market is the fact that forty-six states had fewer
than six health insurance providers with more than a 5% market share.4
According to the American Medical Association, the presence of health
insurer market oligopolies has caused higher health care premiums and
has greatly decreased benefits for patients. Similarly, doctors have been
subject to an imbalance in bargaining power vis-à-vis oligopolistic
health insurance providers.5
The roots of the state health insurance monopolies and oligopolies
can be directly traced to a federal law. Thanks to the McCarran–
Ferguson Act,6 which was passed in 1945, each of the fifty states has the
exclusive power to license health insurance within a state’s own borders
even if, in doing so, a state directly burdens interstate commerce by
shutting out-of-state insurers out of the market. The McCarran–
Ferguson Act purports to allow state governmental discrimination
against inter-state commerce that would otherwise violate the Dormant
Commerce Clause. It is this statute that has created the state health care
oligopolies and monopolies and which is the cause of all our health care
woes. I think Congress can no more license the states to discriminate
against interstate commerce than it can license them to violate the
Contracts Clause.7
The McCarran–Ferguson Act essentially sets up fifty separate state
monopoly or oligopoly markets, each with its own set of state licensed
health insurance providers. Citizens of Ohio who want to buy health
insurance must buy it from an Ohio licensed provider, like Blue Cross
Blue Shield of Ohio. They may not buy health insurance from an out of
state insurer like say Blue Cross Blue Shield of Texas unless the state of
Ohio approves. As a result, citizens buying health insurance pay more
for it and get lower quality services than they would if there was
interstate competition among health insurers. Congress has, in effect,
turned the health insurance market into fifty separate state cartels, and it
4. Focus on Health Reform: How Competitive are State Insurance Markets?, THE HENRY J.
KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Oct. 2011), http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/8242.pdf; see also Bob
Cook, AMA: Health Plan Market Dominance Causes “Competitive Harm,” AM. MED. NEWS (Dec. 10,
2012), http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2012/12/10/bisb1210.htm.
5. AM. MED. ASS’N, COMPETITION IN HEALTH INSURANCE: A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY OF U.S.
MARKETS (2012).
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–15 (2006).
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
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has allowed the states to cut off choices for citizens buying health
insurance. The lack of competition and of choice has led to spiraling
costs for health care and to lower quality health insurance.
This point is made clearer if we consider, as a thought experiment,
what would happen if Congress passed a law allowing the fifty states to
license grocery stores so as to protect in-state grocery stores from outof-state competitors. Imagine what it would be like to buy groceries
from say Whole Foods of Ohio, while being unable legally to buy
groceries instead from Whole Foods of Kentucky? Food would be
much more expensive and the quality of service would clearly be lower
in this hypothetical. Less competition means by definition higher prices
and lower quality service. What is true for grocery stores is also true for
health insurance. The McCarran–Ferguson Act is one of the villains
behind America’s spiraling health care costs and the impending
bankruptcy of Medicare and Medicaid. The country desperately needs
interstate competition among health insurers.8
So how did we get into the mess we are in where health insurers are
insulated from out of state competition when grocery stores are not?
Therein lies an interesting and complex tale of American constitutional
history. The Framers of the U.S. Constitution were desperate to create
one North American common market among the thirteen original states
because, between 1776 and 1787, the states had begun to set up trade
barriers to protect in state businesses from out of state competition.
These early state trade barriers against interstate commerce killed the
American economy in the 1780’s, and the main reason the Philadelphia
Constitutional Convention was convened in 1787 was to give Congress
the power to protect interstate commerce by overriding state barriers to
interstate commerce. The Constitution accomplished this goal in Article
I, Section 8, Clause 3, which says that: “Congress shall have
Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”9 For good measure, Article
IV, Section 2 adds that: “The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to
all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”10
The purpose of these two clauses was to ensure the existence of a
competitive common market among all the states such that interstate
competition was guaranteed. The Supreme Court recognized this in

8. To truly appreciate the insanity of the way in which we provide health care, imagine in my
grocery store hypothetical that not only did States create monopoly or oligopoly providers of groceries,
but that two-thirds of Americans had their groceries purchased by their employers who bought them a
food-care plan with pre-income tax dollars while the other third of the population had to buy their
groceries out-of-pocket in competition with those whose groceries were subsidized.
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
10. Id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
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Gibbons v. Ogden, the first big Commerce Clause case decided under
the Constitution.11 Chief Justice Marshall held unconstitutional, in
Gibbons, a New York state law, which gave monopoly privileges to one
company to provide steamboat ferry service between Elizabethtown,
New Jersey and New York City, thus discriminating against Gibbons’
competing steamboat, which had been licensed under a 1793
congressional law regulating the coasting trade.12
Chief Justice Marshall said in Gibbons v. Ogden that New York State
could not create a steamboat monopoly in this case, first, because
Congress had exercised its commerce power by licensing Gibbons’ boat,
and, second, because even if Congress had not licensed Gibbons’ boat,
the Commerce Power was an exclusively federal power such that states
cannot discriminate against interstate commerce without violating what
has come to be known as the Dormant Commerce Clause. Under the
Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine as it stands today, a state may not
discriminate against interstate commerce or adopt any law that unduly
burdens interstate commerce. If the Dormant Commerce Clause applied
to the health insurance market today, the fifty state healthcare
monopolies and oligopolies would be quite clearly unconstitutional.
The reason the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine does not apply to
the health insurance market today is because in Paul v. Virginia—in
1869—the Supreme Court held that “issuing a policy of insurance is not
a transaction of commerce.”13 The Court seems to have thought that
insurance policies were not merchandise, which was traded and bartered
by merchants, but that such policies instead were adopted pursuant to a
state’s police power to protect the health of that states’ citizens. In the
wake of Paul v. Virginia, there grew up a practice in each of the states
of licensing insurance and of discriminating against out-of-state
insurers. This practice was tempered slightly by the Supreme Court’s
1897 holding in Allgeyer v. Louisiana. In that case, a unanimous Court
held in an opinion by Justice Peckham that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment protected liberty of contract and that a State
could not prohibit a person within its jurisdiction from contracting outof-state with an out-of-state insurer.14 Allgeyer became a dead letter
after the New Deal revolution on the Supreme Court, which ended
economic substantive due process.15
In 1944, the U.S. Supreme Court overruled the Dormant Commerce
11. 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
12. HERBERT A. JOHNSON, GIBBONS V. OGDEN: JOHN MARSHALL, STEAMBOATS, AND THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE 123 (2010).
13. 75 U.S. 168, 183 (1868).
14. 165 U.S. 578, 591 (1897).
15. W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss4/5

4

Calabresi: The Right to Buy Health Insurance Across State Lines: Crony Capit

2013]

THE RIGHT TO BUY HEALTH INSURANCE

1451

Clause holding in Paul v. Virginia in a famous New Deal case: United
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association.16 The New Deal
Supreme Court thought that anything that was sold and bought was
commerce including insurance policies.
The South-Eastern
Underwriters Association opinion triggered a backlash in Congress from
state licensed insurance companies, which led to the passage in 1945 of
the McCarran–Ferguson Act. The McCarran Ferguson Act did not
require that the states regulate insurance, but it did insulate state
regulation of insurance from the federal anti-trust laws, from federal
regulation generally, and from Dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny.
This, in effect, restored the pre-South-Eastern Underwriters status quo
whereby the states could regulate and license insurance companies—an
outcome that insurance companies no doubt lobbied for and sought.
Health insurers today are therefore licensed and regulated by the fifty
states for historical reasons that have nothing to do with an assessment
of whether this outcome is desirable as a policy matter or whether it
serves anyone’s interests other than the interests of current health
insurers. Health insurers are a powerful and formidable special interest
lobby, and they worked together with the Obama Administration and
Congress to prevent repeal of the McCarran–Ferguson Act since that
would have exposed the health insurance industry to competition. The
health insurance industry would have no reason, however, not to love
the ObamaCare tax mandate that pushes people to buy health insurance
since that is the product the insurers are selling. Oligopolies and
monopolies will often price themselves out of the market as to some
consumers because their fees are so outrageously high. It is no wonder,
therefore, that the health insurance lobby would love the ObamaCare tax
mandate because it coerces even more consumers to buy their product
than are already compelled by circumstance to do so.
The question I want to examine in this lecture is whether Congress
has the power under the Constitution to exempt state licensed health
insurance from Dormant Commerce Clause and Privileges and
Immunities Clause scrutiny? Can Congress by passing a statute, like the
McCarran–Ferguson Act, insulate in-state health insurers from
competition from out-of-state health insurers? Can Congress use its
powers under the Commerce Clause, the Tax Clause, or the Necessary
and Proper clause to shut down interstate competition and create fifty
state oligopolies or monopolies in a health insurance industry that
presently accounts for one sixth of the nation’s GDP? Can Congress
promote Crony Capitalism in the health insurance industry by propping
up the big insurers and insulating them from interstate competition?

16. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
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I think the answer to all of these questions is an emphatic “no.”
Congress cannot use its enumerated powers to create or reinforce
monopolies or oligopolies at the state level. Congress cannot exempt
state health insurers from Dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. The
Supreme Court case law, which says that Congress can exempt state
health insurers from Dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny is wrong and
should be overruled. Moreover, I think originalists in particular ought to
agree that the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is generally correct
and that it reflects the fact that most federal powers are exclusive and
not concurrent. Finally, even if the Dormant Commerce Clause did not
render state licensing of insurance unconstitutional, the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV also renders state licensing of insurance
to be unconstitutional at least when the insurance is issued by an
individual and probably also when it is issued by a corporation.
Moreover, all of these questions take on a much greater urgency in
light of the Supreme Court’s upholding of the ObamaCare mandate as a
tax. Congress and President Obama have been practicing Crony
Capitalism by forcing consumers, through the tax code, to buy health
insurance from oligopolists or monopolists. The Supreme Court has
never before held that the Tax Power can be used in this way. This
question needs to be brought before the Supreme Court for its
consideration since the Court in NFIB v. Sebelius did not address the
issues of the constitutionality of the McCarran–Ferguson Act and of the
Affordable Care Act working together in tandem to support oligopoly
and monopoly. I think the combination together of the McCarran–
Ferguson Act with the Affordable Care Act is unconstitutional because
Congress does not have the power to create monopolies outside the area
of patents and copyrights and then compel consumers to buy their
product.
Moreover, even if Congress could create monopolies in other
contexts, it cannot use its Commerce Power to balkanize the nation into
fifty separate state oligopoly or monopoly marketplaces. This kind of
balkanization is arbitrary and capricious. It does not accomplish any
identifiable national goals, while it does cause a huge rise in the cost of
healthcare, which rise is now threatening to bankrupt Medicare and
Medicaid. The Supreme Court ought to put an end to the Crony
Capitalism that is insulating health insurers from interstate competition
and is bankrupting the country. Having upheld the ObamaCare tax
mandate, the Supreme Court now has a special responsibility to make
sure that when Americans are compelled to buy health insurance they
can do so in a competitive and not in an oligopolistic market.
This lecture will consider and address six questions: First, is SouthEastern Underwriters correct in its holding that the buying and selling
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of insurance is commerce? Second, is the Commerce Power at least
partly an exclusive national power such that the Dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine is correct as an original matter? Third, is the Supreme
Court case law correct in so far as it allows Congress to sometimes
override Supreme Court rulings in Dormant Commerce Clause cases?
Fourth, does Congress have the enumerated power to create monopolies
other than by issuing patents and copyrights, and, if it does, can
Congress rationally balkanize the health care industry by creating fifty
separate health insurance oligopolies and monopolies at the state level?
Fifth, does the McCarran–Ferguson Act violate the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV by denying to “The Citizens of each
State . . . all [the] Privileges and Immunities [that are enjoyed by]
Citizens in the several States.” And, Part VI concludes.
I. THE BUYING AND SELLING OF INSURANCE IS COMMERCE
Congress has power under Article I, Section 8, Clause 3: “To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes.”17 Is the buying and selling of insurance policies
“Commerce” as that word is used in Article I, Section 8? There are in
essence two theories that are widespread, today, as to the meaning of the
word “Commerce” in the Commerce clause. Both of these theories may
very well be wrong.
First, some scholars and judges, led by Professors Randy Barnett18
and Rob Natelson,19 argue that the word “Commerce” refers only to the
interstate trade and barter of goods and commodities among merchants.
Professors Barnett and Natelson think that the word “Commerce” does
not include the buying and selling of goods and services in the intrastate
fields of manufacturing, mining, or agriculture, and they think further
that the Framers meant to draw a line between trade as a category which
is federally regulable and manufacturing, mining, and agriculture as
categories control over which is reserved to the States. Under
Professors Barnett and Natelson’s reading, Congress has no enumerated
power to pass either the McCarran–Ferguson Act20 or the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act.21 Both acts license and regulate the
insurance industry, and, if the Commerce Clause only gives Congress

17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
18. Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101
(2001).
19. Robert G. Natelson, The Legal Meaning of “Commerce” in the Commerce Clause, 80 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 789 (2006).
20. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–15.
21. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2011).
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power to regulate trade, then Congress lacks the power to license and
regulate insurance as the U.S. Supreme Court held long ago in Paul v.
Virginia.22
Professors Barnett and Natelson make a very powerful originalist case
for reading the word “Commerce” to mean only “Trade among
merchants” using source materials drawn from the Eighteenth Century.
Their view of the Commerce Clause was, however, rejected by the
Supreme Court, in 1937, in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel23 and in
1941 in United States v. Darby.24 Since the New Deal era, the Supreme
Court has read the Commerce Clause as applying to more than just trade
among merchants in upholding the Civil Rights Act of 196425—a
foundational event—and in recent years only one justice out of nine—
Justice Clarence Thomas—has argued for reading the Commerce Clause
as applying only to trade among merchants and not to manufacturing,
mining, and agriculture.26
I will thus take it to be settled law in this lecture that the Barnett–
Natelson reading of “Commerce” as meaning only “Trade among
merchants” has been carefully considered and has been decisively
rejected by a substantial majority of the American people acting through
the Supreme Court since at least 1937. Observers have long noted that
the Supreme Court follows presidential and senatorial election returns
and is rarely out of step with a majority of the American people for a
long period of time.27 Like Justice Scalia, I am a sufficiently fainthearted originalist to be unwilling to hold the New Deal
unconstitutional.28 The Supreme Court should not overrule Jones &
Laughlin Steel, Darby, or for that matter the 1944 decision in United
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, which itself overruled
Paul v. Virginia. A longstanding interpretation of the Constitution,
shared by all three branches of the federal government, acquiesced to by
the States, and which the American people consistently seem to approve
of counts as a settled precedent which trumps the original meaning of
the Constitution.
22. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
23. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
24. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
25. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
U.S. 294 (1964).
26. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2677 (2012) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 598–99 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
27. The argument that the Supreme Court follows presidential and senatorial election returns and
is rarely out of step with a majority of the American people is made in: Robert A. Dahl, Decisionmaking
in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. LAW 279 (1957); GERALD
N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
28. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862 (1989) (Justice
Scalia said this in his William Howard Taft Lecture).
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Rejecting the Barnett–Natelson reading of the word “Commerce” as
meaning “Trade” does not answer the question of what the word
“Commerce” now means. A second, and very different group of
scholars and judges from Barnett and Natelson, led by Yale Law
Professor Jack Balkin, argue that the word “Commerce” not only
includes manufacturing, agriculture, and mining, but that it also includes
all forms of social intercourse, exchange, and interaction! Professor
Balkin thinks that the Commerce Clause allows Congress to regulate
any activity, even non-economic activities, which in any way spills over
from one state to another and thus has interstate effects.29
Professor Balkin’s interpretation of the Commerce Power holds that
the act of buying and selling is utterly irrelevant to defining the meaning
of the word “Commerce.” Professor Balkin thinks that Congress could
use its commerce power to regulate all forms of social intercourse,
exchange, or interaction anywhere in the United States. No Commerce
Clause precedent that I am aware of goes this far. Professor Balkin is
quite simply wrong in arguing that the post-1937 Commerce Clause
applies to all forms of social intercourse, exchange, or interaction even
when buying and selling is not going on.
Professor Balkin supports his broad reading of the Commerce Clause
as being an Intercourse Clause by citing Samuel Johnson’s dictionary
from the era of the Founding.30 Samuel Johnson defines the word
“Commerce” as meaning:
Cómmerce. n.s. [commercium, Latin. It was anciently accented on the
last syllable.] Intercourse; exchange of one thing for another; interchange
of any thing; trade; traffick.

The etymology of the word “Commerce” is given in The Chambers
Dictionary of Etymology as being:
Commerce n. 1537, borrowed from Middle French commerce, learned
borrowing from Latin commercium trade, trafficking (com- together, with
+ merx, genitive mercis wares, merchandise; see MARKET)31

The second syllable of the word “Commerce” is thus “mercis” a Latin
root that appears in such other English words as “mercenary,”
“mercantile,” “merchant,” “merchandise,” and “market.” The root
“mercis” refers in Latin to the buying and selling of goods or
“merchandise” a meaning that would have been self-evident to the
Framers so many of whom knew Latin and were trained in the classics.
The word “intercourse” in Samuel Johnson’s dictionary at the time of
29. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 149–52 (2011).
30. Id. at 149.
31. THE CHAMBERS DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY (Robert K. Barnhart & Sol Steinmetz eds.,
2006).
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the Founding did not yet include sexual intercourse, but it did refer
instead to the “exchange of one thing for another.” In other words, the
word “intercourse” in 1787 referred to buying and selling and not to
gratuitous transfers.
The Framers might well have considered
prostitution to be a form of “intercourse” in 1787 since prostitution is an
activity that involves the buying and selling of sex. The buying and
selling of slaves was clearly considered to be commerce, which is why it
was thought necessary in Article I, Section 9, Clause 1 for the Framers
to forbid congressional interference with the slave trade prior to 1808.
When Congress banned the importation of new slaves from Africa in
1808, it did so under its power to regulate commerce—the buying and
selling of human beings—in our trade with foreign nations. There is no
enumerated federal power, other than the Commerce Power, under
which Congress could have banned the foreign slave trade after 1808.
Professor Balkin and others make much of the fact that Chief Justice
Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden says the following:
The subject to be regulated is commerce . . . . Commerce, undoubtedly,
is traffic, [buying, selling or the interchange of commodities,] but it is
something more: it is intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse
between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated
by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse. The mind can
scarcely conceive a system for regulating commerce between nations,
which shall exclude all laws concerning navigation, which shall be silent
on the admission of the vessels of the one nation into the ports of the
other, and be confined to prescribing rules for the conduct of individuals,
in the actual employment of buying and selling, or of barter.

What Professor Balkin overlooks is that Chief Justice Marshall makes it
as clear as day in Gibbons that the “intercourse” that is included within
the meaning of “commerce” is “commercial intercourse”—i.e.
intercourse or interaction where there is buying and selling going on.
Marshall does not talk of “a commerce in ideas” in Gibbons v. Ogden as
Balkin seems to think.
Moreover, the Gibbons case on its facts involved the validity of a
New York State law that gave Ogden and others a legal monopoly right
to offer steamboat trips in exchange for money between Elizabethtown,
New Jersey and New York City. Gibbons wanted to compete in this
market by offering his own steamboat service between New Jersey and
New York City in exchange for money. In the context of Gibbons v.
Ogden, Congress’s Commerce Power included a power over the
navigation at issue because it was “commercial navigation.” Gibbons v.
Ogden was not a case that was all about the trading of ideas, but it was a
case about the legal right to buy and sell interstate ferryboat trips.
Professor Balkin’s claim that Gibbons was about social intercourse,
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exchange, or interaction ascribes to Gibbons language that is not in
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion and language that would have been
dicta had it been in the Gibbons opinion. The holding in Gibbons was
that New York could not give a monopoly to one company on the
buying and selling of interstate ferry boat rides to the exclusion of
another company. There was buying and selling go on in Gibbons v.
Ogden.
The federal government can certainly regulate commercial navigation
under the Commerce Clause, but federal power to regulate recreational
navigation poses a harder question. Federal regulation of recreational
and non-commercial navigation among the States is probably in most
situations incidental to federal regulation of commercial navigation and
is thus probably within Congress’s power to enact under the Necessary
and Proper Clause while carrying into execution the Commerce Power.
The key point, however, is to remember that Gibbons, itself, was a case
where buying and selling was going on and the holding of the case is
confined to that commercial context.
There is today a lot of federal regulation of people travelling in
interstate commerce by air, train, or in cars and trucks which are
federally regulated under the Interstate Commerce Act and which occurs
in a commercial setting. Shipping merchandise or people for hire is
obviously a commercial activity that involve buying and selling, and
which Congress can therefore regulate under the Commerce Clause.
Similarly, recreational travel on those federal highways, railroads, air
plane routes, and by ferry boats which belong to the federal government
would seem to be authorized by Congress’s power under Article IV,
Section 3 “to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States.”32
I cannot think of a single Commerce Clause case that either holds or
implies that Congress can regulate the intercourse of ideas or even the
recreational travel of people that Balkin writes about. Every single
Commerce Clause case—except for Gonzales v. Raich33—involved the
regulation either of buying and selling or of an actor who was to some
extent engaging in buying and selling. Even in Wickard v. Filburn,34 a
32. U.S. CONST. art IV, § 3, cl. 2.
33. 545 U.S. 1 (2005). This case could be understood, as Justice Scalia argued in his
concurrence, as being a Necessary and Proper Clause case. 545 U.S. 1, 38–39 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Congress’s power to outlaw the buying and selling of marijuana would be fatally undercut
if individuals could grow and possess marijuana in their homes. The ban on possession of marijuana
was thus incidental to Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause to ban the buying and selling of
marijuana. I am not persuaded by Justice Scalia’s concurrence and would have joined the dissent, but I
think Scalia’s argument here is a plausible one.
34. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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famous New Deal case, which read the Commerce Clause expansively,
the farmer who was trying to grow wheat on his farm was a commercial
farmer who wanted to feed some of his homegrown wheat to livestock
that he would ultimately sell.
Congress can forbid race discrimination in entities engaged in
commerce, and I will stipulate that the buying and selling of hotel rooms
and of food and of places of public accommodation can all be regulated
under the post-1937 understanding of the Commerce Clause together
with the Necessary and Proper Clause. But, Congress cannot regulate
all forms of gratuitous social intercourse under the Commerce Clause as
Professor Balkin suggests. This is a simple misunderstanding of the
original meaning of the word “Commerce.” There is a textually
plausible middle ground between reading the word “Commerce” to
mean “Trade among merchants” and reading it to mean “Intercourse.”
That middle ground is to read “Commerce” to mean “Buying and
Selling.” This reading is the one that is the most faithful to the
Commerce Clauses etymological Latin roots.
I want to close my consideration of the original dictionary meaning of
the word “Commerce” as comprehending only “Buying and Selling” by
considering the approved examples Samuel Johnson’s dictionary offers
as exemplary usages of the word. Examples three, four, and five are as
follows:
3. Instructed ships shall sail to quick commerce, By which remotest
regions are ally’d; Which makes one city of the universe, Where some
may gain, and all may be supply’d. Dryden.
4. These people had not any commerce with the other known parts of the
world. Tillotson.
5. In any country, that hath commerce with the rest of the world, it is
almost impossible now to be without the use of silver coin. Locke.

None of these three exemplary usages supports Balkin’s reading of the
word “Commerce” as encompassing all forms of social intercourse,
exchange, or interaction. The examples given from Dryden and Locke
clearly contemplate the activity of buying and selling. John Locke
specifically says that no country that has commerce with the other
known parts of the world can be without silver coins. He thus clearly
understands commerce as the buying and selling of goods or services
and not as a social exchange or interaction or gratuitous transfer.
Dryden, in turn, talks explicitly of “Commerce” allowing some to “gain”
and all to be “supply’d.” Again, Dryden is clearly using “Commerce” as
if it referred to buying and selling. The approved usages from Tillotson
seems to me to be best understood as using the word “Commerce” to
connote buying and selling, although it is arguably vague. Two other
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exemplary usages of the word “commerce” are also essentially void for
vagueness.35 One talks of the commerce between God and mankind, a
concept, which could mean anything depending on whether one believes
in God and, if so, how one thinks we interact with him.
The bottom line is that Balkin’s attempt to turn the Commerce Clause
into an Intercourse Clause is not clearly supported by any of the five
exemplary usages in Samuel Johnson’s dictionary. It is also not
consistent with the etymology of the word “Commerce,” nor is it
consistent with the facts and holding of Gibbons v. Ogden, a case that
concerned the buying and selling of ferry boat tickets. The word
“Commerce” in Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 plainly refers at a bare
minimum to activities where buying and selling is going on.
Commercial intercourse can be regulated under the Commerce Clause
but non-commercial intercourse cannot be. No post-1937 Commerce
Clause case embraces Balkin’s reading of commerce as meaning social
intercourse, exchange, or interaction. The buying and selling of
manufactured goods and service, or of agricultural products, or of mined
products is commerce under a post-1937 understanding of the
Commerce Clause but gratuitous or social or academic intercourse are
not.
II. THE COMMERCE POWER IS PARTLY EXCLUSIVE
The buying and selling of health insurance is clearly commerce
among the several states—under the post-1937 understanding. Neither
Balkin nor I disagree about that. There is quite simply no reason to
think that the buying and selling of health insurance implicates State
power any more than does the buying and selling of apples or of
services in a hotel or restaurant or of dental services.36 It is true that
even after 1937 the States retain a local police power over the health,
morals, and public safety concerns of their citizens but that State police

35. The two other approved usages are from Hooker and from Shakespeare. They read as
follows:
1. Places of publick resort being thus provided, our repair thither is especially for mutual
conference, and, as it were, commerce to be had between God and us.
Richard Hooker, The Works of that Learned and Judicious Divine, Mr. Richard Hooker (1723).
2. How could communities, Degrees in schools, and brotherhoods in cities, Peaceful
commerce from dividable shores, But by degree stand in authentick place?
Troil. and Cress, in 8 William Shakespeare, The Plays of William Shakespeare (1804). Neither of these
two examples clearly uses the word “Commerce” to mean social intercourse, interaction, or exchange. 1
SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1820).
36. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
U.S. 294 (1964).
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power ends under Jones & Laughlin Steel37 or under Darby38 once there
is buying and selling are going on. The health insurance industry is just
as much an industry as are General Motors and Ford. Just as the
Commerce Clause allows Congress to regulate automobile emissions on
cars that are bought and sold, the Commerce Clause also allows
Congress to regulate the buying and selling of health insurance.
The next question is to ask is whether the power to regulate
commerce among the states belongs in part exclusively to the national
government or whether such commerce can always be concurrently
regulated by the states. In a series of cases, the Supreme Court has held
that the Commerce Power is in part exclusive and that it precludes state
legislation that discriminates against or burdens commerce among the
States. In these Dormant Commerce Clause cases, state laws that
regulate commerce where Congress has not acted may nonetheless
violate the Dormant Commerce Clause if they discriminate against or
unduly burden commerce among the States.
Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas take issue with the
Supreme Court’s Dormant Commerce Clause caselaw, which they think
violates the original meaning of the Commerce Clause.39 Justice Scalia
makes a very powerful argument in Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v.
Washington State Department of Revenue,40 but at the end of the day I
disagree with Justices Scalia and Thomas and think that as an original
matter it is likely that the Commerce Power was meant to be at least in
part an exclusively congressional prerogative.
I would begin by noting that the overwhelming majority of powers
granted in the original Constitution were exclusive federal powers. The
enumeration of powers in Article I, Section 841 operates at least in part
in tandem with Article I, Section 10,42 which explicitly forbids the states
from doing certain things that the federal government is empower to do.
Thus, Article I, Section 8 read together with Article I, Section 10 make
it clear that five of the eighteen federal powers enumerated in Section 8
are exclusive. Thus, Congress has the exclusive power: 1) to lay
uniform taxes, duties, imposts, and excise taxes on exports or imports;
2) to coin money and to make anything but gold and silver coin a tender
in payment of debts; 3) to declare war, grant letters of marque and
reprisal; 4) to raise and support armies; and 5) to provide and maintain a

37. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
38. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
39. Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 254, 259–65 (1987)
(Scalia J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
40. Id.
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
42. Id. art. I, § 10.
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navy. In addition, Article II, read together with Article I, Section 10
makes it clear that the President and the Senate’s power to enter into
treaties with foreign nation is also an exclusively federal power.43
The critics of the Dormant Commerce Clause have inferred that since
Article I, Section 10 expressly makes five of the eighteen federal powers
exclusive the other thirteen federal powers must be concurrent. But, if
one excludes the Commerce Power and the Necessary and Proper
Clause Power from consideration, and if one looks at the other eleven
Section 8 powers that do not have a Section 10 analogue, it is obvious
on the face of things that these federal powers are all clearly exclusive
as a matter of original meaning as well. Article I, Section 8, clause 2
gives Congress the power “To borrow Money on the credit of the United
States.”44 No one would seriously contend this power was concurrent.
Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 gives Congress the power to adopt uniform
rules of naturalization.45 Again, this power is obviously an exclusively
federal power, which the states cannot exercise concurrently. As
Alexander Hamilton specifically said in The Federalist No. 32, the
federal government’s power “to establish an UNIFORM RULE of
naturalization throughout the United States[] . . . must necessarily be
exclusive; because if each State had power to prescribe a DISTINCT
RULE, there could not be a UNIFORM RULE.”46 This is striking
because Article I, Section 10 does not bar the States from adopting
naturalization laws so this is at least one exclusive federal power in
Article I, Section 8 which has no Article I, Section 10 analogue.
Article I, Section 8, Clause 5 gives Congress the power to “fix the
Standard of Weights and Measures.”47
The existence and
meaningfulness of the grant of this power to Congress would be
obviously be endangered if it could be concurrently exercised by the
states. This is especially relevant to the question of whether there is a
Dormant Commerce Clause because the Commerce Power could itself
be read as granting Congress the power to “Fix the Standard of Weights
and Measures” even if this Clause had been omitted from the
Constitution.
Similarly, Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 gives Congress the power to

43. Id. art. II, § 2; id. art. I, § 10.
44. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
45. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. This clause goes on to give Congress exclusive power to pass bankruptcy
laws, but, surprisingly, the Marshall Court held in Sturges v. Crowninshield that the power to adopt
bankruptcy laws was held concurrently by Congress and the States. 17 U.S. 122, 193–96 (1819). Chief
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Joseph Story seemed to take this back in Ogden v. Saunders. 25 U.S.
213, 335 (1827) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
46. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST NO. 32.
47. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
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grant copyrights and patents.48 Again, it seems on the face of things that
as a matter of original meaning this must be an exclusively federal
prerogative as well at least as to novel inventions and writings. Justice
Scalia in his opinion in Tyler Pipe argues the patent power was found to
co-exist with some degree of state power in the 1970’s Burger Court
case Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp,49 and that the copyright power
was also found by the Burger Court to co-exist with state power in
Goldstein v. California.50 But, the Burger Court’s originalist bona fides
are open to question, and a recent provocative working draft by Camilla
Hrdy posted on the Social Science Research Network (SSRN)51
concedes that the “states do not grant their own patents and have not
done so for over two hundred years.”
The fact of the matter is that Congress alone issues patents for novel
inventions, there is a United States Patent and Trademark Office which
alone issues such patents, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit alone hears patent appeals from federal district courts which
have exclusive jurisdiction over those appeals.52 “[T]he prevailing view
of the Supreme Court and of legal academia [is] that the Constitution
prohibits states from granting patents.”53 Professor Hrdy notes that prior
to the ratification of the Constitution the States had issued patents, but
this, of course, is completely irrelevant to the question of whether the
Constitution divested the States of this power. Professor Hrdy shows
that New York State and a few other States created monopolies after the
Constitution went into effect, but she errs in equating all monopolies
with patents and she overlooks the strong anti-monopoly tradition in
Anglo-American law discussed in Steven G. Calabresi & Larissa Price,
Monopolies and the Constitution: A History of Crony Capitalism.54 She
ends up conceding that, “Today it is essentially a unanimous assumption
that states cannot grant their own patents.” Professor Hrdy quotes
Edward Walterscheid, “the preeminent historian of the IP Clause and
American patent law” as saying that “the ‘enactment of federal patent
and copyright laws in 1790 was largely viewed as removing the needs
for state patents and copyrights, because the advantages of uniformity
and broader protection inherent in the federal system were obvious to
almost everyone.’”55 Congressional power to issue patents and
48. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
49. 416 U.S. 470, 479 (1974).
50. 412 U.S. 546, 560 (1973).
51. Camilla A. Hrdy, State Patent Laws in the Age of Laissez Faire, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
(forthcoming Feb. 2013).
52. Id. at 2.
53. Id. at 4.
54. Calabresi & Price, supra note *.
55. Id. at 7 (quoting Edward C. WALTERSCHEID, NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
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copyrights was obviously meant to be an exclusive national power.
Otherwise, State patents and copyrights might frustrate the federal law
governing the degree of protection given to intellectual property.
Two clauses in Article I empower Congress specifically to punish
crimes. Article I, Section 8, Clause 6 allows Congress to punish
counterfeiting,56 and Article I, Section 8, Clause 10 allows Congress to
punish piracy and felonies committed on the high seas and offenses
against the law of nations.57 Both these clauses seem most plausibly to
contemplate an exclusively federal role. State punishment of piracy and
of offenses against the law nations, while not forbidden by Article I,
Section 10 would have dire foreign policy consequences. State
punishment of counterfeiting of federal money also seems like an odd
thing to contemplate.
Article I, Section 8, Clause 7 gives Congress power to establish post
offices and post roads, and Article I, Section 8, Clause 9 gives Congress
power to constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court. The Post
Office has always been an exclusively federal operation while the states
have never tried to create or regulate the jurisdiction of new tribunals
that are inferior to the Supreme Court. Again, our practice in this area
clearly contemplates an exclusive role for the national government and
for Congress.
Article I, Section 8, Clause 14 gives Congress power “To make Rules
for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;”58
while Article I, Section 8, Clause 15 allows Congress to federalize the
state militias to “suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;”59 and
Article I, Section 8, Clause 16 allows Congress to make rules for the
“organizing, arming, and disciplining [of the] Militia, and for governing
such Part of them” as has been federalized.60 None of these Clauses
have analogues in Article I, Section 10, but all three of these federal
powers are clearly meant to be exclusive. In Houston v. Moore, the
Supreme court upheld a State court-martial jurisdiction over members of
the state militias, but that is hardly a surprise because the militias, unlike
the U.S. Army and Navy are state institutions, which we today call
national guard units.61
Finally, Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 gives Congress power “To
exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever” in the District of

CLAUSE 436–37 (2002)).
56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6.
57. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
58. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
59. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
60. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
61. 18 U.S. 1, 25–28 (1820).
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Columbia.62 Again this is an exclusive federal power with no Article I,
Section 10 analogue. Justice Scalia claims in Tyler Pipe that the use of
the word “exclusive” here implies that the Commerce Power is held
concurrently with the States, but this seems like an effort to make an
awfully small tail wag a very large dog. The word “exclusive” in the
District of Columbia Clause is more plausibly read as a provision added
ex abundanti cautela—out of an abundance of caution—to make it even
clearer than it already was that the States had NO power at all in the
District of Columbia.
Looking outside of Article I, Section 8, it is clear that many, although
not all powers that are vested or are implied elsewhere in the original
Constitution were meant to be exclusive. The President’s powers to
execute the law, as Commander in Chief, to pardon, to make treaties
(with the senate) and to appoint officers of the United States (with the
senate) are all obviously exclusive federal powers that are not shared
concurrently in any way with the states.63 On the other hand, the
jurisdiction of the Article III federal courts over nine categories of cases
and controversies64 has always been concurrent unless Congress
expressly divests the states of jurisdiction in an area, which it can and
does sometimes do.65
Congress has power under Article IV, Section 1 to pass a full faith
and credit statute. This is obviously an exclusively federal power.
Article IV, Section 2 contains clauses requiring the states to return
fugitives from justice and fugitive slaves.66 In Prigg v. Pennsylvania,67
the Supreme Court held in an opinion by Justice Joseph Story that the
Fugitive Slave Clause, read together with the Necessary and Proper
Clause,68 gave Congress the exclusive power to regulate the return of
fugitive slaves. Justice Story thus invalidated a Pennsylvania state
statute that regulated the use of self-help in recovering fugitive slaves on
the grounds that it was preempted by the federal constitution even
absent federal statutory preemption.
Article IV, Section 3 gives Congress power to admit new states into
the Union,69 and it also gives Congress the power “to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
62. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
63. See id. art. II, §§ 1–3 (granting and describing the president’s powers and the duties imposed
on him).
64. Id. art. III, § 2 (giving the federal courts jurisdiction over only nine categories of cases and
controversies).
65. See, e.g., Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130 (1876).
66. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cls. 2 & 3.
67. 41 U.S. 539 (1842).
68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
69. Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
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Property belonging to the United States.”70 These powers of Congress
are all obviously exclusive even absent a statement to that effect in
Article I, Section 10. Article IV, Section 4 imposes on Congress the
duty and the power to “guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government.”71 Again, one does not need Article I,
Section 10 to know that this is an exclusively federal power. Finally,
Article V does give both Congress and the states a role in amending the
Constitution, but it does so by expressly describing the state powers that
were contemplated.72 Any effort by the states to amend the Constitution
outside of Article V would plainly be unconstitutional.
Thus, almost every congressional grant of power beyond the five that
are matched by explicit Article I, Section 10 prohibitions on the States
turns out upon closer examination to be a grant to the federal
government of exclusive power. This should predispose us in looking at
the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses toward the conclusion
that federal powers are presumptively exclusive rather than
presumptively concurrent. This is why the old doctrine of dual
federalism,73 which was temporarily extinguished in 1937, turns out to
have been right after all, in some respects, although maybe not in so far
as it denied federal power that bore on manufacturing where there is
buying and selling going on.
The federal sphere and the state sphere of power in the Constitution
are mostly separate and distinct and are not congruent and overlapping.
The New Dealers denied this because they wanted government to be
able to regulate the liberty and property of persons both at the federal
and at the state level. Michael Greve following Richard Epstein calls
this a program of “cartels at every level”—both federal and state.74 The
New Deal understanding was wrong, however, and it is in obvious
tension with the text of the Constitution. Michael Greve shows this
brilliantly in his splendid new book The Upside-Down Constitution.75
I want now to talk about an exclusive federal sphere in the most
famous Necessary and Proper Clause cases before turning to the
exclusivity of the Commerce Clause. My reason for starting here is that
most readers will assume that congressional power under the Necessary
and Proper Clause must be concurrent to state power and not exclusive
of it. The Clause does after all refer to incidental, implied federal

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
Id. art. IV, § 4.
Id. art. V.
Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1 (1950).
MICHAEL GREVE, THE UPSIDE-DOWN CONSTITUTION 211 (2012).
Id.
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powers while imposing fiduciary limits on Congress to act “properly.”76
One would think, therefore, that incidental, implied federal powers
might often be concurrent, but in one of the most important cases it ever
decided the Supreme Court said otherwise.
In McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice Marshall struck down a state
tax, which fell exclusively on a Maryland branch of the Bank of the
United States.77 The Maryland law violated no federal statute, but
Marshall held it was preempted by the Constitution anyway. Congress
would surely have had power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to
pass a federal statute that would have preempted state taxes that fell
exclusively on the federal Bank but here Congress had not acted.
Marshall said in effect that the Dormant Necessary and Proper Clause
preempted the Maryland state tax even where Congress had not acted.
The Maryland tax on the federal Bank was an unconstitutional effort by
the state of Maryland to tax an institution that all the other states were
paying for. The Dormant Commerce Clause idea is thus central to
McCulloch v. Maryland. In fact, as John Hart Ely shows in Democracy
and Distrust, the Dormant Commerce Clause theme of McCulloch v.
Maryland embodies a whole theme of judicial policing of the political
process to prevent the States from “discriminating” against federal
instrumentalities and officers who may lack power in the State political
processes.78
More recently, the Supreme Court has struck down other state laws
that intruded into the federal sphere holding that the states may not
establish term limits for Members of Congress79 and finding, as Justice
Scalia quite rightly did, that state tort law cannot be used to second
guess the military’s design choices on a helicopter escape hatch.80
During the scandals in the Administration of President Bill Clinton, the
question arose whether the president of the United States could be
prosecuted by a state while he was serving as president.81 The best
commentary at that time and my own view is that “no,” a state cannot
prosecute a president until his term as president is over. Otherwise a
single state prosecutor could hobble and paralyze one whole branch of
the federal government. Presidents cannot be prosecuted until they
leave office either as a result of impeachment or because their terms

76. GARY LAWSON, GEOFFREY P. MILLER, ROBERT G. NATELSON, & GUY SEIDMAN, THE
ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE (2010).
77. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
78. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 85–86 (1980).
79. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 820–21 (1995).
80. Boyle v. United Tech., 487 U.S. 500, 511–12 (1988).
81. Akhil Reed Amar & Brian C. Kalt, The Presidential Privilege Against Prosecution, 2 NEXUS
11 (1997).
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come to an end.
So what about the exclusivity of Congress’s Commerce Power? Is
federal power under Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 exclusive, concurrent,
or a mixture of both. The Clause says that Congress shall have power
“To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes.”82 There are thus three parts to the
Commerce Clause all of which intersect: a foreign Commerce Clause,
an Indian Commerce Clause, and the Commerce Among the States
Clause.83 Congress’s power to regulate commerce with foreign nations
is almost certainly an exclusive federal power. Article I, Section 10
explicitly forbids the states from entering into any treaties, alliances or
confederations, and it is hard to imagine how a state could regulate
commerce with foreign nations if it could not enter into treaties,
alliances, or confederations.
The same argument almost certainly applies to “Commerce . . . with
the Indian Tribes.” This is almost certainly an exclusive federal power
as well since the Article I, Section 10 bar on entering into treaties,
alliances, or confederations appears to apply to state undertakings with
the Indian Tribes and not only with foreign nations. The bar in Article I,
Section 10 applies to all treaties, alliances, and confederations and not
merely those with foreign nations. It thus presumptively applies to the
Indian Commerce Clause as well as to the Foreign Nations Commerce
Clause. Both those clauses appear to grant Congress exclusive power
over the commerce in question.
What then can be inferred as to commerce among the several states?
There is an important canon of textual interpretation that goes by the
name of noscitur a sociis.84 This canon reflects the idea that a word or
clause might be construed in light of the company it keeps and the
context it appears in.85 Professor Saikrishna Prakash has quite rightly
argued that the Commerce Among the States Clause should be construed
under noscitur a sociis in light of the Foreign and Indian Commerce
82. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
83. Saikrishna Prakash, Our Three Commerce Clauses and the Presumption of Intrasentence
Uniformity, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1149 (2003).
84. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 195 (2012).
85. Thus, Article I, Section 10 bars the States from passing Bills of Attainder, Ex Post Facto
Laws, or Laws impairing the Obligation of Contracts. In Calder v. Bull, the Supreme Court had to
decide whether the ban on State ex post facto laws banned only retroactive criminal laws or whether it
banned retroactive civil laws as well. 3 U.S. 386 (1798). The Court concluded that the Ex Post Facto
Laws Clause banned only retroactive criminal laws because if it were read to ban retroactive civil laws
the Contracts Clause would have become redundant. See generally id. In Ogden v. Saunders, a
majority of the Court held that only retroactive impairments of contracts were prohibited by the Contract
Clause and not prospective impairments. 25 U.S. 213 (1827). Chief Justice Marshall, joined by Justice
Story dissented. Id. Noscitur a sociis was discussed there as well. Id.
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Clauses to which it is attached. For this reason, Professor Prakash
argues correctly that the substantially affecting interstate commerce line
of cases identified in United States v. Lopez ought to be viewed not as
Commerce Clause cases but instead as Necessary and Proper Clause
cases because no-one thinks that Congress has power under the Foreign
or Indian Commerce Clauses to regulate activities in foreign nations or
on Indian tribal lands that substantially affect U.S. commerce.86
The same noscitur a sociis argument applies to the exclusivity of the
three Commerce Clause heads of power. If congressional power is
exclusive under the Foreign Commerce Clause and under the Indian
Commerce Clause then maybe it is exclusive in the Commerce Among
the States Clause as well? It is at least a little odd to think that the word
“Commerce”, which is mentioned only once in Article I, Section 8,
Clause 3, is exclusive with foreign nations, concurrent with the states,
and exclusive with the Indian Tribes. This is a possible construction,
but it seems surprising especially since the overwhelming majority of
constitutional power grants are exclusive rather than concurrent.
Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Joseph Story offer a second
argument for the exclusivity of the Commerce Clause in a powerful
dissenting opinion in the 4-to-3 ruling in Ogden v. Saunders.87 Ogden v.
Saunders was a case that arose under the Contracts Clause of Article I,
Section 10, which provides that “No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”88 The issue in the case was
whether a state law that prospectively limited the right to make contracts
was unconstitutional or whether the Contracts Clause only applied
instead to retrospective laws limiting freedom of contract. The majority
thought that only a retrospective law could “impair the Obligation of
Contracts.” The use of the word “obligation” made it clear to the
majority that for the Contract Clause to be triggered a contract had to
already be in effect when the challenged law was passed. Chief Justice
Marshall and Justice Story, however, argued in dissent that the
Commerce Clause of Article I, Section 8 and the Contracts Clause of
Article I, Section 10 should be read together as removing the whole field

86. Since the Foreign and Indian Commerce Clauses are not read as conferring power to pass
laws about wholly foreign or Indian activities that substantially affect U.S. commerce, Professor Prakash
argues it is non-sensical to read the “Commerce Among the States Clause” as one that allows federal
laws based on the Commerce Clause to ban wholly intrastate activities merely because they substantially
affect interstate commerce. This is a noscitur a sociis argument that the domestic Commerce Clause can
be best understood with the Foreign and Indian Commerce Clauses in mind. The answer, of course, is
that the substantially affecting interstate commerce line of cases are all really Necessary and Proper
Clause cases instead of being Commerce Clause cases as Chief Justice Rehnquist said they were in
United States v. Lopez.
87. 25 U.S. 213 (1827).
88. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
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of commercial legislation from the states and granting it exclusively to
the federal government.
Chief Justice Marshall only dissented once during his thirty-four year
tenure on the bench. The lone Marshall dissent in Ogden v. Saunders
was, moreover, joined by Justice Story and occurred in a case decided
on a 4-to-3 vote. The very fact that Marshall and Story thought there
was such a tight nexus between the Commerce Clause and the Contracts
Clause shows again how wrong Jack Balkin is when he claims that
Marshall understood “commerce” as including more than buying and
selling. One cannot enter into a binding contract under the common law
unless there is consideration, which is being bought or sold. Moreover,
Marshall’s argument that the Commerce and Contracts Clauses work in
tandem explains his support for the idea of the Dormant Commerce
Clause in Gibbons v. Ogden. Both the Commerce Clause and the
Contracts Clause were enacted in part to protect constitutionally the
freedom to buy and sell. The Marshall and Story dissent in Ogden v.
Saunders is thus quite plausible.
A final argument, which for me seals the question that the commerce
power was originally meant to be an exclusive federal power, is that I
think, as a general matter, the Constitution ought usually to be read with
the expressio unius, exclusio alterius canon of construction in mind.
Under this canon, the writing down of one thing, especially in a list,
should usually be presumed to exclude other things that are not
mentioned. This is a useful canon to invoke to ensure that the
constitutional text does not become a jumping off point as opposed to
being the beginning and the end of a constitutional analysis.
Thus, the Constitution says that Congress shall have the power to
regulate commerce just as it says that Congress shall have power to fix
the standard of weights and measures and just as it says that the
President shall have the pardon power. Expressio unius, exclusio
alterius applies. The writing down and giving of this power to
Congress, or to the President, implies that the same power has been
taken away from the states. When the Constitution contemplates a role
for the states as to a power it has conferred on Congress it provides for
such a role textually as in the amendment process in Article V. Powers
not delegated by the states to the federal government are reserved to the
states or to the people, but the commerce power has, in fact, been
delegated to the Congress. Expressio unius, exclusio alterius. The
states no longer have the power to regulate commerce among the states
just as they no longer have the power to regulate commerce with foreign
nations or with the Indian Tribes.
Of course the principle of expressio unius, exclusio alterius applies to
the prohibitions on State actions in Article I, Section 10 as well as to the
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rest of the Constitution. The listing of prohibitions on state actions may
be the only things the federal government is empowered to do which the
states cannot also do. But, if that is the case then the states can adopt
naturalization laws, they can fix the standard of weights and measures,
they can run a post office, and they can prosecute the President under
state law during his term in office. Congress can by statute under the
Necessary and Proper Clause preempt such action, but the Constitution
by itself does not accomplish the preemption. I think this view is at war
with the foundational second holding of McCulloch v. Maryland and is
thus clearly wrong.
The best way to understand the Article I, Section 10 list of things the
States cannot do is to recognize that it was added ex abundanti
cautela—out of an abundance of caution. This is not a widely known
principle of construction, but I think it is foundational in U.S.
constitutional law and is essential to mention.89 Sometimes language
gets added to a legal text two or three times for the same reason that
people may lock the doors to their apartments and houses with two
locks. If you really care about something you will sometimes protect it
twice!
My favorite example ex abundanti cautela in constitutional
interpretation is the Opinions Clause in Article II, which enumerates a
presidential power to request the opinions in writing of the principal
officer in each of the executive departments of government. Some law
professors argue that this proves the Vesting Clause of Article II is not a
general grant of the executive power including removal power to the
President. If it was, they say the Opinions Clause would become
redundant.90
I disagree. I think the Opinions Clause was added out of an
abundance of caution ex abundanti cautela and that the president would
have had this power even if Article II, Section 2 had not explicitly
provided for it.91
It is a mistake to try zealously to construe constitutional provisions so
that nothing is redundant. When Constitution writers feel strongly about
something they sometimes say it twice! Article I, Section 10 is an
example of this. The powers of the federal government are all exclusive
and the states have no reserved power to regulate in the federal sphere
but out of an abundance of caution Article I, Section 10 makes this even
more emphatic as to some of the federal enumerated powers. This does
not mean the other federal enumerated powers like the Commerce and
89. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 84, at 176–77.
90. Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 72 (1994).
91. Akhil Reed Amar, Some Opinions on the Opinion Clause, 82 VA. L. REV. 647 (1996).
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Necessary and Proper Clause powers are concurrent. It simply means
that the Framers double-locked the door on state intrusion in the federal
domain as to war, foreign policy, and issuance of paper money where a
state role would be especially destructive.
In my opinion, the canon of expressio unius, exclusio alterius for
grants of power is the master canon in all of constitutional law.
Expressio unius, exclusion alterius is of central importance to
understanding the Constitution. I will now try to prove this by
discussing six other contexts where the canon’s applicability is
dispositive one way or the other. Cumulatively, these six examples
show that I am right to argue that the Commerce Power is an exclusive
power of the federal government.
First, almost twenty years ago, Larry Lessig and Cass Sunstein argued
in a much cited and admired article in the Columbia Law Review that the
Framers believed there were actually four powers of government,
instead of three, and that they believed there was an Administrative
Power in addition to the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Power.92
Lessig and Sunstein thought that this unwritten belief of the Framers
was originally part of the Constitution. They made an explicitly
originalist argument against the unitary executive on historical grounds.
My response then and now was that Lessig and Sunstein’s view was
nonsense because the writing down in the Constitution of the three
traditional powers of government was meant to be an exclusive list.
Expressio unius, exclusio alterius. There is no unenumerated fourth
power of government in the Constitution.93 In theory, any list in the
Constitution could be either an exclusive list or an exemplary list.
Given the Framers concerns about cabining government power, it is as
clear as day that they would not have failed to mention something as
important as a fourth power of government, if they had believed it
existed. Moreover, the Framers not only neglected to talk about the
fourth power of government in the Constitution; such a power also goes
unmentioned in the Federalist Papers and in Anti-Federalist writings.
The central claim of Lessig’s and Sunstein’s article is quite simply
absurd. The first context of constitutional interpretation where the
expressio unius, exclusio alterius canon of interpretation applies then is
with the enumeration of three and only three types of governmental
powers.
A second exclusive list of powers that appears in the Constitution is
the list of the nine categories of cases or controversies that the Article III
federal courts have jurisdiction to hear. This list is precisely described
92. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 90.
93. Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws,
104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994).
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as comprehending the only cases and controversies to which the federal
judicial power “shall extend.” In National Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Tidewater Transfer Co.,94 the Supreme Court upheld a federal statute
allowing citizens of the District of Columbia to sue citizens of a state in
the diversity jurisdiction even though doing so seemed to add to the list
of nine categories of cases or controversies that Article III empowers the
federal courts to hear. Interestingly, although a majority of the Court
upheld the federal statute, a majority of the justices also said in dicta that
Congress cannot add to the nine categories of cases or controversies that
Article III empowers the federal courts to hear. A majority of the
Supreme Court held that expressio unius, exclusio alterius applies to the
Article III list of nine heads of jurisdiction. Congress may not give the
federal courts power to hear cases or controversies that are not on that
list.
A third exclusive list of powers in the Constitution appears in Article
I, Section 8 which enumerates eighteen and only eighteen powers of
Congress some of which are admittedly pretty broad. When cases like
United States v. Lopez say that the federal government is one of limited
and enumerated powers, one of the things that is implied is that the
listing and enumeration of congressional powers was meant to be
exclusive and not exemplary.95 The Tenth Amendment makes it even
clearer that the Article I, Section 8 list is exclusive and that all powers
not delegated to the federal government by the Constitution are reserved
respectively to the States or to the federal government.96 Again,
expressio unius, exclusio alterius underlies all of the many case law
claims that the federal government is one of limited and enumerated
powers however broad some of those powers may be.
It should be noted here that Justice Stephen Breyer in United States v.
Comstock reads the Article I, Section 8 list as being in effect an
exemplary list by claiming that the 18th Clause—containing the
Necessary and Proper Clause—is a freestanding grant of power to
Congress to enact any law not within the prior seventeen clauses so long
as it is “necessary and proper” which words he further dilutes to mean
“convenient or useful”97 But, the Necessary and Proper Clause is not a
freestanding invitation to Congress to pass all useful laws. The text of
the Necessary and Proper Clause expressly limits the power to the
enacting of laws which carry into execution some other enumerated
power. The Article I, Section 8 list is thus an exclusive list, and it
exemplifies the expressio unius, exclusio alterius principle of
94.
95.
96.
97.

337 U.S. 582 (1949).
514 U.S. 549, 592 (1995).
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010).
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construction.
As I have just shown both the Article III, Section 2 list of nine
categories of cases or controversies that the federal courts can hear and
the Article I, Section 8 list of enumerated powers of Congress are
exclusive lists of powers, but the list of the President’s powers in Article
II is, in my opinion, quite different. The Vesting Clause of Article II
vests a President of the United States with all of the executive power,
which the later sections of Article II go on to define, limit, and explain
in part. Thus, the President is given a general grant of the executive
power in Section 1, and Section 2 of Article II then goes on to elaborate
how the executive power will work in the context of the President being
Commander in Chief and of his having the pardon power, the power to
request opinions from the heads of departments, and the appointment
and treaty powers shared with the Senate etc . . . .98
I think the best way to understand Article II is to read it as providing
an exemplary list of some but not necessarily all executive powers.
“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States”, and it shall include e.g. (exempli gratia—for the sake of an
example) the Commander in Chief Power, the Pardon Power, etc . . . .
Thus, the President has: 1) the removal power even though it is not
explicitly listed, as Myers v. United States99 held; 2) he has the power to
control all prosecutions brought in the name of the United States even
though that power is not specifically listed, see Robertson v. United
States ex rel Watson;100 3) he has the power to take life without a basis
in statute to protect government officials, see In re Neagle;101 and 4) he
has at least some unenumerated foreign policy powers, see United States
v. Curtis Wright.102 The executive power of the President of the United
States is a grab bag of powers left over after all legislative powers herein
granted are given to a Bicameral Congress and after it is made clear that
the judicial power to hear nine and only nine categories of cases or
controversies is given to the life tenured Article III federal courts.
Anything that is not done by the federal government with either: 1)
bicameralism and presentment or 2) in a case or controversy decided by
a life tenured Article III court is an exercise of “The executive Power”
all of which is vested in the one President.
The contrasting view of Article II is the one taken by Justice Hugo
Black in his opinion of the court in the Youngstown Steel Seizure

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 93, at 575.
272 U.S. 52, 119 (1926).
130 S. Ct. 2184 (2010).
135 U.S. 1, 59 (1890).
299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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Case.103 Justice Black seemed to read Article II as if it said “The
executive Power shall be vested in a President, and (it is—id est) or i.e.
the Commander in Chief power, the pardon power etc . . . .” The
problem textually with Justice Black’s reading of Article II is that he
implicitly rewrites the text to say (as Articles I and III do) either that
“All executive Powers herein granted shall be vested in a President” or
“The executive Power shall extend to: a finite list of enumerated
powers.” But, Justice Black’s reading of Article II is simply incorrect.
Expressio unius, exclusio alterius does not apply to the list of
presidential powers in Article II, Section 2. Nor does it apply to the list
of duties imposed on the President in Article II, Section 3 like the duties
of giving a state of the union address or receiving ambassadors or taking
care that the laws be faithfully executed. In fact, the President would
arguably not have the power to fulfill the duties which Article II,
Section 3 imposes on him if the Vesting Clause of Article II were not
itself a grant of the executive power. The wording of the Take Care
Clause as one that imposes a duty on the President thus strengthens the
argument that the Vesting Clause of Article II had already conferred on
him the executive power.
Yet another example of expressio unius, exclusio alterius arose with
the Civil War, which raised the question whether the southern states
could unilaterally secede without permission from Congress or the other
states in the union. A question here is whether the Tenth Amendment
reserves a power of secession to the states. For a textualist, the place to
look for an answer to this question is in Article IV, which is the part of
the Constitution that originally addressed federal-to-state and state-tostate constitutional relations.
Article IV explicitly provides that “New States may be admitted by
the Congress into this Union,”104 and it also explicitly protects the states
from having their boundaries changed without their consent, but it is
silent on the question of whether a state can secede. Since the
constitutional text specifies a way by which states can join the union but
no way by which they can leave it, I think the likeliest inference to draw
is that unilateral secession is not permissible without the adoption of a
constitutional amendment specifying what the secession process should
be? Will the process require Congress’s consent? The consent of a
majority of the other States? Consent of three-quarters of the other
States? The text just does not say although it does address these issues
for states joining the union. Expressio unius, exclsuio alterius—the
Constitution’s specificity on how a state can join the union coupled with

103. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
104. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
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its silence on how states can leave means that a constitutional
amendment is needed before a state could ever legally secede.105
This, of courses, brings me to United States Term Limits v.
Thornton106 and Powell v. McCormack107 both of which held that the list
of three qualifications only to serve in Congress was an exclusive list
instead of being an exemplary list that Congress or the States could add
qualifications to. A majority of the Supreme Court held in both cases, in
effect, that expressio unius, exclusio alterius applied to the
Qualifications Clauses and that neither the Houses or Congress nor the
States could add additional new qualifications for holding office. As a
matter of pure textualist originalism, the majority view seems right to
me, but it does overlook a two-hundred year practice of the states
disallowing felons from voting or presumably from running for office.
If forced as a judge to choose between the text’s exclusive listing of
three qualifications for holding federal office and contrary practice I
would go with the text and join Justice Stevens’ opinion in United States
Term Limits v. Thornton.
Yet another famous invocation of expressio unius, exclusio alterius is
to be found in Marbury v. Madison108 where Chief Justice Marshall
invokes the canon to say that Congress cannot add cases to the Supreme
Court’s original jurisdiction. For reasons that are too complicated to
explain in this article, I think Marshall was actually wrong here,109 but it
is perhaps the most famous instance in American history of the
expressio unius, exclusio alterius canon being invoked.
Finally, consider whether the Article V procedures for amending the
Constitution are an express and exclusive list or whether they are merely
an example of one of perhaps many ways in which the Constitution
might be amended. Yale Law School Professor Akhil Reed Amar has
argued that the Constitution can be amended by a simple majority vote
in a national referendum without going through the cumbersome
processes described in Article V.110 Amar says Article V is merely one
way of amending the Constitution, but it is not the only way. Amar’s
argument is purely originalist and focused on an 18th Century Lockean
belief that a simple majority could always legally alter or abolish its
forms of government. I think Professor Amar has confused a right to
105. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.).
106. 514 U.S. 779, 783 (1995).
107. 395 U.S. 486, 550 (1969).
108. 5 U.S. 137, 138 (1803).
109. Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Hamdan Case, the Unitary Executive, and the
Constitutionality of Jurisdiction Stripping: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia, 107 COLUM. L. REV.
1002 (2007).
110. Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55
U. CHI. L. REV. 1043 (1988).
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revolution against a wicked, usurping government with the legal right to
change the U.S. Constitution as it is written. Article V is the only
process by which the U.S. Constitution can be legally changed.
Expressio unius, exclusio alterius.
Another Yale Law Professor, Bruce Ackerman, has also devoted his
entire scholarly career to defending the legitimacy of what he calls the
New Deal Constitutional Moment, which in Ackerman’s view
successfully amended the Constitution outside of Article V.111
Ackerman’s theory fails for the same reason as does Amar’s. Article V
enumerates the only way in which the Constitution can be amended
because of expressio unius, exclusion alterius. This master canon of
constitutional interpretation makes it clear that Ackerman and Amar are
wrong.
What these six examples all taken together show is that the canon of
expressio unius, exclusio alterius for grants of power is, as I argued
above, the master canon in all of constitutional law. One simply cannot
understand the Constitution without appreciating the force in many
contexts of expressio unius, exclusio alterius. The six examples I just
gave help to show cumulatively that the Commerce Power is an
exclusive power of the federal government and that the old doctrine of
dual federalism is actually correct. The fact that the Supreme Court has
not always understood that is irrelevant either as a matter of textualism
or of originalism. Article I, Section 8, clause 3 completely preempts
State regulations of commerce among the States and the health
insurance industry is, as I have shown, engaged in such commerce. The
next question, which thus arises is whether Congress can trump the
Dormant Commerce Clause by delegating its commerce power over
health insurance to state regulators. Can Congress overturn Supreme
Court opinions like South-Eastern Underwriters simply by passing a
statute?
III. CAN CONGRESS OVERRULE THE SUPREME COURT IN DORMANT
COMMERCE CLAUSE CASES?
As a general rule, it is widely believed that Congress cannot overturn
Supreme Court interpretations of the Constitution by passing a simple
statute. Ever since the Supreme Court’s path-breaking opinion in
Marbury v. Madison most Americans have quite rightly believed that
111. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 23 (1998); BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS:
JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY (2005); Steven G. Calabresi, The
President, the Supreme Court, and the Founding Fathers: A Reply to Professor Ackerman, 73 U. CHI. L.
REV. 469 (2006) (book review).
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the federal courts have the last word in properly filed cases or
controversies as to what the Constitution means as applied to the parties
in those cases or controversies. Alexander Hamilton argued as much in
The Federalist No. 78, and in the Founding era even Thomas Jefferson
who hated the federal courts conceded that they had the last word on
properly filed cases or controversies.112 Jefferson argued that Congress
and the President were co-equal constitutional interpreters along with
the federal courts, and he thus believed that the President should sign or
veto laws, execute laws, and issue pardons based on his own
independent interpretation of the Constitution.113
Jefferson thus
believed in what we today call Departmentalism—the view that all three
branches of the government must and do interpret the Constitution when
they exercise their assigned powers. But, even Jefferson acknowledged
that the federal courts have the last word on cases or controversies that
are properly before them.
Other Departmentalist opponents of judicial supremacy have followed
Jefferson’s lead. James Madison, Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln,
Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Ronald Reagan all claimed the political
branches had co-equal status in enforcing the constitution with the
courts.114 But, they all also conceded that the courts had the last word as
to the litigants whose cases or controversies were before them. Andrew
Jackson is sometimes said to have once said in a case involving the
rights of Native Americans that “John Marshall has made his decision
now let him enforce it,” but most historians today do not believe
Jackson ever said this. In any event, there is a widespread consensus
that if Jackson did ever say this he was wrong in saying it and his
utterance has been repudiated by the unbroken practice of his
successors.
Professor Michael Stokes Paulsen claims that President Abraham
Lincoln asserted a presidential power to overturn Supreme Court
judgments in Ex Parte Merryman—an 1861 case where Lincoln
declined to release a Confederate terrorist, John Merryman, to whom
Chief Justice Roger B. Taney had granted a writ of habeas corpus.115
112. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST NO. 78; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Charles
Hellstedt (Feb. 14, 1791), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 126–27 (Andrew A. Lipscomb &
Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1904) (“[T]he Constitution of the United States having divided the powers of
government into three branches, legislative, executive, and judiciary, and deposited each with a separate
body of magistracy, forbidding either to interfere in the department of the other, the executive are not at
liberty to intermeddle in [a] question [that] must be ultimately decided by the Supreme Court.”).
113. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams (Sept. 11, 1804), in 11 THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 50–51 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1904); see also Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to George Hay (June 2, 1807), in 11 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
213–16 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1904).
114. PAULSEN ET AL., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 219–38 (2010).
115. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861).
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But Paulsen’s reading of Lincoln’s claim of power is almost certainly
wrong because Lincoln did otherwise follow court judgments won by
individual litigants including ones like Dred Scott v. Sandford,116 which
he strongly disagreed with. Lincoln’s claim of power in Ex Parte
Merryman coupled with his support for execution of the judgment in
Dred Scott shows that at most Lincoln thought that the State of
Maryland where John Merryman was arrested was in a state of martial
law in the spring of 1861 and that the civil courts should be considered
as being closed. Congress evidently agreed since it retroactively
approved everything Lincoln had done in the spring of 1861 including
suspending the writ of habeas corpus. Had Congress not agreed with
Lincoln, it could have impeached him for defying Taney’s judgment,
and the fact it never considered doing so means Lincoln’s disposition of
Merryman’s case as arising under martial law was correct.
Only one law professor out of several thousand, to my knowledge,
has denied that federal court judgments as to individual litigants in cases
or controversies properly before them are binding on the executive and
legislative branches. That law professor is Michael Stokes Paulsen, my
co-author and good friend.117 Paulsen thinks the President can exercise
his own independent constitutional judgment in deciding whether or not
to execute court judgments. In Paulsen’s view, if a person violates say
the federal partial birth abortion act and a court holds the act
unconstitutional the President can nonetheless arrest and imprison that
person if the President disagrees with the court as to that case or
controversy.
I have previously written a short essay in which I explain why I think
Professor Paulsen is wrong.118 First, the courts do not have the power to
issue advisory opinions. If presidents could decide for themselves
whether or not to implement court judgments then court opinions would
be advisory. We know the Framers deliberately did not give the federal
courts the power to issue advisory opinions. In Hayburn’s Case in the
1790’s, the federal courts held they could only exercise judicial power
where in doing so there was a substantial likelihood that their ruling
would make a difference in the real world. The Framers must therefore
have understood court judgments as being binding as to their execution
by the President and the executive branch.
Second, the President may not under the Fifth Amendment deprive

116. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
117. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive
Branch Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 81, 84, 88–99 (1993).
118. Steven G. Calabresi, Caesarism, Departmentalism, and Professor Paulsen, 83 MINN. L. REV.
1421, 1425 (1999); see also Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation of Judicial
Decision-Making, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 191 (2001).
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any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. It
was well settled in 1789 and is even clearer today that litigants have a
property right in their court judgments. Thus, a Paulsen-like presidential
power to deprive people of the value of their court judgments is a
violation of the due process clause.
Finally, even if Paulsen was right that Andrew Jackson and Abraham
Lincoln on one occasion did not follow a court judgment they were
bound to follow, this that would not change the fact that for 223 years
presidents have in all but two instances acted as if they were bound by
court judgments. Such an overwhelmingly followed practice must be
constitutional if practice counts for anything in constitutional law, which
I think it does. Paulsen is thus just plain wrong in his claim that
Presidents can refuse to execute court judgments that they disagree with
on constitutional grounds.
This then raises the next question, which is whether Congress can
overturn court judgments in particular cases or controversies that were
properly before the courts? The U.S. Supreme Court famously
answered that question in Justice Antonin Scalia’s opinion in Plaut v.
Spendthrift Farm.119 The Court ruled in that case that Congress may not
retroactively require courts to reopen final judgments in cases that they
had previously decided. Justice Scalia, writing for six of the nine
justices, said quite rightly that Congress had violated the separation of
powers by telling courts retroactively to reopen judgments. Plaut thus is
a recent Supreme Court holding of six justices that Congress may not
interfere with the courts’ disposition of properly filed, individual cases
or controversies.
A question that Plaut does not dispose of is whether Congress can
enact laws pursuant to its Section 5 power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment in a way that contradicts a Supreme Court interpretation of
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment in another case or controversy.
This issue reached the Supreme Court in City of Boerne v. Flores in
1997.120 The Supreme Court had previously held in 1990 in a 5-to-4
ruling in Employment Division v. Smith121 that the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment as incorporated by Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment forbade only laws that discriminated on their face against
religion and not those that were facially neutral but which had a
disparate impact. Congress disagreed. By near unanimous votes in both
the Senate and the House of Representatives, Congress adopted and
President Clinton signed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA)—a statute that was plainly designed on its face to overrule
119. 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
120. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
121. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2013

33

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 5

1480

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81

Employment Division v. Smith. The Supreme Court heard a subsequent
cases or controversy, City of Boerne v. Flores, in which the litigant
asked it to give effect to RFRA and not to its precedent in Employment
Division v. Smith. The Supreme Court held that RFRA, as it applied to
the states, was unconstitutional because Congress could not use its
power under Section 5 to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment to change
the meaning the courts had given to Section 1.
City of Boerne v. Flores squarely holds that Congress cannot enact
laws pursuant to its Section 5 power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment in a way that contradicts a prior Supreme Court
interpretation of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment in another case
or controversy like Employment Division v. Smith. As I have previously
written, City of Boerne v. Flores is correct as an interpretation of the
scope of Congress’s Section 5 power, but wrongly decided on the facts
because Employment Division v. Smith is wrong as to the original
meaning of the incorporated Free Exercise Clause and of what the
Supreme Court calls the Equal Protection Clause.122 City of Boerne v.
Flores thus squarely and correctly holds that Congress may not by
statute change the meaning the Supreme Court has given to any portion
of the Constitution including the Fourteenth Amendment. This ruling
reflects the fact that while Congress has the power by a two-thirds vote
of both Houses to overrule a presidential veto, it does not have a similar
power to overrule Supreme Court decisions with which it disagrees.
Separation of powers and judicial independence stop Congress from
being able to overrule the Supreme Court by statute.
The issue of congressional power to overrule by statute a Supreme
Court decision again reached the Supreme Court in 2000 in Dickerson v.
United States.123 Dickerson involved a congressional effort by statute to
overrule the Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona that
required that criminal defendants be given a Miranda warning once they
were taken into custody prior to police interrogation.124 Two years after
Miranda was handed down, Congress passed a law, which directed the
courts to admit statements of criminal defendants if they were made
voluntarily even if they had received no Miranda warning. Dickerson
sought to suppress statements that he had made to the FBI prior to
receiving his Miranda warning and the district court suppressed
Dickerson’s statements. The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the
congressional statute overturning Miranda was good law,125 and the
U.S. Supreme Court then reversed the Fourth Circuit.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Calabresi & Salander, supra note *.
530 U.S. 428 (2000).
384 U.S. 436 (1966), superseded by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3501.
United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999), rev’d, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
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Chief Justice Rehnquist said in his opinion for seven of the nine
justices of the Supreme Court that the rule of Miranda was a
constitutional rule which the federal courts had applied for decades to
state court decisions which they had reviewed and that Congress could
not by statute overturn an established Supreme Court ruling like the one
in Miranda. The opinion was especially startling to many observers of
the Supreme Court because it came from Chief Justice Rehnquist who
was well known for his opposition to Miranda and for his efforts to limit
Miranda as a precedent. Rehnquist obviously thought that the principle
that Congress cannot overturn Supreme Court decisions by statute was
more important than getting rid of Miranda. I agree with Chief Justice
Rehnquist that Congress cannot overturn Supreme Court decisions by
statute, but I disagree with the holding in Dickerson because I disagree
with the holding in Miranda.
We have thus seen that in three very important recent cases Rehnquist
has held that Congress may not overturn Supreme Court decisions by
passing a statute. I want now to turn to the question of whether
Congress had the power to overturn the holding of South-Eastern
Underwriters that the buying and selling of insurance across state lines
was commerce by passing the McCarran–Ferguson Act. The question
that is raised here is whether in Dormant Commerce Clause cases,
Congress somehow has the power it lacks under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to overturn Supreme Court doctrines and
precedents with which Congress disagrees?
The Supreme Court first considered the question of congressional
power to overrule the Dormant Commerce Clause in Justice Benjamin
Curtis’s famous opinion in Cooley v. Board of Wardens.126 I will draw
here in my discussion of Cooley and of the Dormant Commerce Clause
from Sullivan & Gunther’s classic casebook on federal constitutional
law.127 In Cooley v. Board of Wardens, a Pennsylvania law of 1803
required that ships entering and departing from the port of Philadelphia
hire a local pilot to direct their trip through the harbor.128 A federal
statute enacted by Congress in 1789 said that:
[A]ll pilots in the bays, inlets, rivers, harbors, and ports of the United
States shall continue to be regulated in conformity with the existing law
of the states, respectively, wherein such pilots may be, or with such laws
as the states may respectively hereafter enact for the purpose, until further
legislative provision shall be made by Congress.129

126.
127.
128.
129.

Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens of Port of Phila., 53 U.S. 299 (1851).
GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 251–52 (15th ed. 2004).
Id. at 251–55.
Id.
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The Supreme Court had ruled previously in Gibbons v. Ogden that
Congress’s commerce power included a congressional power to regulate
navigation. Moreover, in Gibbons, Chief Justice John Marshall strongly
implied that the federal commerce power was an exclusive national
power and that it, of its own force, preempted states laws that regulated
either commerce or navigation among the several states.130 Since the
Pennsylvania law of 1803 regulated navigation among the states in
entering the port of Philadelphia, it was arguably preempted by the
Constitution.
In a famous opinion, Justice Benjamin Curtis gave birth to the
modern Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine by saying two things of
great importance. First, Justice Curtis said that
If the States were divested of the power to legislate on this subject by the
grant of the commercial power to Congress, it is plain this act [of
Congress in 1789] could not confer upon them power thus to legislate. If
the Constitution excluded the States from making any law regulating
commerce, certainly Congress cannot regrant, or in any manner reconvey
to the States that power. And yet this act of 1789 gives its sanction only
to laws enacted by the States.

Justice Curtis concludes from this, quite correctly, that the congressional
statute did not and could not authorize the States to regulate commerce
among the states, but that it instead reflected Congress’s recognition that
pilotage into and out of state ports was not interstate commerce or
navigation within the meaning of the Commerce Clause.131 Chief
Justice John Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden famously distinguished
between commerce and navigation among the States, as to which
Congress had exclusive power, and wholly intrastate commerce or
navigation that the States could regulate. In Gibbons, the issue was the
constitutionality of a New York State law granting a monopoly on an
interstate commercial ferry service between New York City and
Elizabethtown, New Jersey. Chief Justice Marshall quite properly
struck this monopoly down because it impeded buying and selling in
navigation between the States of New York and New Jersey.
In Cooley v. Board of Wardens, however, Congress itself had
recognized that wholly intrastate navigation by pilots into and out of
particular ports was intrastate navigation and not navigation among the
several States.132
Justice Curtis agreed with this congressional
determination and said that:
Either absolutely to affirm, or deny that the nature of this power requires
130. Id. at 244–50.
131. GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 127, at 250–55.
132. Id.
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exclusive legislation by Congress, is to lose sight of the nature of the
subjects of this power, and to assert concerning all of them, what is really
[only] applicable but to a part. Whatever subjects of this power are in
their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of
regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require
exclusive legislation by Congress. That this cannot be affirmed of laws
for the regulation of pilots and pilotage is plain . . . .
Viewed in this light, so much of this act of 1789 as declares that
pilots shall continue to be regulated ‘by such laws as the [S]tates may
respectively hereafter enact for that purpose,’ [is] instead of being held to
be inoperative, as an attempt to confer on the [S]tates a power to legislate,
of which the Constitution had deprived them, is allowed an appropriate
and [manifest] signification. It manifests the understanding of Congress,
at the outset of the government, that the nature of this subject is not such
as to require its exclusive legislation.133

In other words, Justice Curtis did not say in Cooley v. Board of Wardens
that Congress could delegate to the states the power to regulate
commerce among the states. He said instead that Congress had by
statute recognized a fact which he as a judge thought was true which
was that navigation into and out of a state port was intrastate navigation
and was not navigation among the states as described by Chief Justice
Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden.134
Gunther and Sullivan explain that the issue of congressional power to
override judicial holdings striking down state laws for intruding on
Congress’s exclusive commerce power next arose in 1890.135 The
Supreme Court held in Leisy v. Hardin that Iowa had intruded on
Congress’s exclusive power over commerce among the states when it
passed a law banning the sale of alcohol which law was applied to beer
brewed in Illinois and offered for sale in Iowa.136 Chief Justice Fuller
applied the test in Cooley and said that the sale of alcohol across state
lines was commerce among the states and that Congress had the
exclusive power to regulate such commerce.137
Congress responded a few months later by passing the Wilson Act,
which said that alcohol
transported into any [s]tate or [t]erritory or remaining therein for use,
consumption, sale, or storage therein, shall upon arrival in such [s]tate or
[t]erritory be subject to the operation and effect of the laws of such [s]tate

133. Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens of Port of Phila., 53 U.S. 299, 319–20 (1851). GUNTHER &
SULLIVAN, supra note 127, at 250–55.
134. 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
135. GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 127, at 333–35.
136. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890).
137. GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 127, at 333–34.
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or [t]erritory enacted in the exercise of its police powers, to the same
extent and in the same manner as though such . . . liquors had been
produced in such [s]tate or [t]erritory . . . .138

In 1891, the Supreme Court held in Wilkerson v. Rahrer that the states
could now apply their prohibition laws to alcohol sold in commerce
among the states once the alcohol arrived in the Prohibitionist State.139
The Court in Wilkerson explained that:
[C]ongress has not attempted to delegate the power to regulate
commerce, or to exercise any power reserved to the States, or to grant a
power not possessed by the [S]tates, or to adopt state laws . . . . [It]
imparted no power to the State not then possessed, but allowed imported
property to fall at once upon arrival within the local jurisdiction . . . . No
reason is perceived why, if [C]ongress chooses to provide that certain
designated subjects of interstate commerce shall be governed by a rule
which divests them of that character at an earlier period of time than
would otherwise be the case, it is not within its competency to do so.140

The Wilkerson Court like the Cooley Court was thus crystal clear in
saying that Congress could, by law, specify where commerce among the
several states ends and where wholly intrastate commerce and police
powers begin, but it did not say that Congress could authorize the states
to regulate commerce among the several states.
In 1913, Congress passed the Webb–Kenyon Act, which as Gunther
and Sullivan explain, forbade the shipment of alcohol into a state if it
was to be “in any manner used in violation of any law of such State.”141
The Supreme Court upheld this federal law in The Distilling Company v.
Western Maryland Railroad Co. saying that the act was “but a larger
degree of exertion of the identical power which was brought into play in
the [Wilson Act].”142 Gunther and Sullivan note that “The substance
and much of the language of the Webb–Kenyon Act was written into the
Twenty-[F]irst Amendment, which also repealed the Eighteenth
[Amendment which had enacted Prohibition].”143 Thus, on the eve of
the New Deal crisis of 1937, the Supreme Court was on record saying in
Cooley v. Board of Wardens that Congress could not delegate its power
to regulate commerce among the states, and the Twenty-First
Amendment was in place to provide specific authorization for Congress
to ban the importation of alcohol into any state in violation of state law.
Prior to 1937, Congress could decline to regulate commerce that the
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Wilson Act, 27 U.S.C. § 121 (1890).
GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 127, at 334; Wilkerson v. Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891).
Id. at 561–64. GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 127, at 334.
GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 127, at 334.
Id. (citing James Clark Distilling Co. v. W. Md. R. Co., 242 U.S. 311, 330 (1917)).
Id. at 334 n.1.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss4/5

38

Calabresi: The Right to Buy Health Insurance Across State Lines: Crony Capit

2013]

THE RIGHT TO BUY HEALTH INSURANCE

1485

Supreme Court agreed was wholly intrastate, but it could not overturn
Supreme Court Dormant Commerce Clause holdings.
In United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, the
Supreme Court held in 1944 that the Sherman Antitrust Act applied to
the insurance industry, which it said was a “nationwide business”
involving the buying and selling of insurance.144 The Court held as we
saw above that the Commerce Clause allowed Congress to regulate the
buying and selling of insurance, and it in the process overruled a
contrary holding in Paul v. Virginia. By 1944, the domestic New Deal
was at an end because President Franklin D. Roosevelt had lost his
governing majority as to domestic issues. In 1945, a conservative
Congress responded to South-Eastern Underwriters by passing the
McCarran–Ferguson Act. Gunther and Sullivan explain that this act
declared that:
‘[T]he continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the
business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the part
of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the
regulation or taxation of such business by the several States.’ [Section 2
of the Act further provided that] ‘(a) The business of insurance [shall] be
subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or
taxation of such business. (b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to
invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the
purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or
tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the
business of insurance.’145

The McCarran–Ferguson Act on its face went way beyond Cooley v.
Board of Wardens and the alcohol prohibition cases discussed above
which are authorized today by the Twenty-First Amendment. The
McCarran–Ferguson Act does not seek to draw a plausible line between
interstate and intrastate commerce as the Pilotage Act in Cooley did or
as the Wilson Act did as to sales of alcohol. The McCarran–Ferguson
Act instead overturned Justice Curtis’s holding in Cooley that Congress
could not delegate to the state its national and exclusive power to
regulate commerce among the several states. Readers should be
reminded at this point that Justice Curtis said in Cooley that:
If the [S]tates were divested of the power to legislate on this subject by
the grant of the commercial power to Congress, it is plain this [pilotage]
act [of Congress in 1789] could not confer upon them power thus to
legislate. If the Constitution excluded the [S]tates from making any law
regulating commerce, certainly Congress cannot re-grant, or in any

144. 322 U.S. 533, 546 (1944).
145. GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 127.
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manner re-convey to the States that power.146

Justice Curtis was right, and the supporters of the McCarran–Ferguson
Act were wrong. Congress cannot delegate to the fifty states its power
to regulate commerce among the states.
Unless South-Eastern Underwriters was wrong in holding that the
buying and selling of insurance, which was already in 1944 a nationwide
business was not “commerce among the several States,” then the
McCarran–Ferguson Act itself must exceed the scope of federal power
by seeking to delegate to the states a power that the Constitution assigns
to the federal government. The McCarran–Ferguson Act looked at in
context seems to be much like the federal laws that the Supreme Court
held unconstitutional in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms; City of Boerne v.
Flores; and United States v. Dickerson. Just as those acts of Congress
had sought unconstitutionally to overturn a Supreme Court ruling, so too
did the McCarran–Ferguson Act seek unconstitutionally to overturn
South-Eastern Underwriters. Congress gave the states carte blanche to
regulate the insurance industry in the McCarran–Ferguson Act even in
ways that openly discriminate against commerce among the several
states. Congress cannot do this. It has no enumerated power to cartelize
a nationwide industry in which buying and selling is going on and turn it
into fifty state-run oligopolies or monopolies.
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the McCarran–
Ferguson Act in Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin.147 Justice Wiley
Rutledge wrote for a unanimous New Deal Supreme Court that if
Congress and the states wanted to use the Commerce clause to set up
fifty state insurance cartels there was nothing in the Constitution that
precluded that. The issue in Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin was
the constitutionality of a discriminatory tax that South Carolina had
levied against Prudential, a New Jersey corporation. No similar tax was
levied against South Carolina corporations. It was undisputed in this
case that the South Carolina tax would have violated the Dormant
Commerce Clause but for the McCarran–Ferguson Act.
Justice Rutledge was of the view that Congress and the states could
legally get together and set up forty-eight state insurance cartels
whereby the states could legally discriminate against out-of-state
insurers. Justice Rutledge thought that Congress’s power under the
Commerce Clause was plenary especially because in the case of the
McCarran–Ferguson Act both the democratic Congress and the
democratic process in the forty-eight states wanted the state insurance
146. Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens of Port of Phila., 53 U.S. 299, 318 (1851).
147. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946); see also Robertson v. California, 328
U.S. 440 (1946) (upholding state regulations of insurance backed by criminal penalties as well as the
discriminatory state taxation upheld in Prudential); GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 127, at 335–36.
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cartels. He also thought that the judicial application of the Dormant
Commerce Clause was more of an art than a science and that Congress
should therefore have the power to overrule Supreme Court Dormant
Commerce Clause holdings. As Justice Rutledge put it in his opinion:
[The Dormant Commerce Clause] is not the simple, clean-cutting tool
supposed. Nor is its swath always correlative with that cut by the
affirmative edge, as seems to be assumed. For cleanly as the commerce
clause has worked affirmatively on the whole, its implied negative
operation on state power has been uneven, at times highly variable. More
often than not, in matters more governable[ed] by logic and less by
experience, the business of negative implication is slippery. Into what is
thus left open for inference to fill divergent ideas of meaning may be read
much more readily than into what has been made explicit by
affirmation . . . . That the clause imposes some restraint upon state power
has never been doubted. For otherwise the grant of power to Congress
would be wholly ineffective. But the limitation not only is implied. It is
open to different implications of meaning. And this accounts largely for
variations in this field continuing almost from the beginning until now.148

Justice Rutledge was right of course that some Dormant Commerce
Clause cases present close calls. Cooley v. Board of Wardens was such
a case since federal commerce power over the Gibbons v. Ogden
interstate ferry service had been held to be a federal power while the use
of state and local pilots to guide ships in and out of major state ports was
found in Cooley itself (with guidance from an Act of Congress) to be a
state power. But it does not follow that just because Cooley, the Wilson
Act, and the Rahrer case were close calls that Prudential Insurance Co.
v. Benjamin and the McCarran–Ferguson Act were also a close call as to
which the Supreme Court ought to have totally deferred to Congress!
The McCarran–Ferguson Act does not, like the federal pilotage Act of
1789 in Cooley, draw a fine line between intrastate and interstate
navigation. It bluntly and outrageously gives the states carte blanche to
discriminate against out-of-state insurers both by taxing them and by
regulating them differently from in-state insurers. What the Supreme
Court does in Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin is to turn the
Commerce Clause, which on its face guarantees free trade among the
several states, into a power for Congress to authorize the states to in
effect set up customs booths and tariffs for insurers every time they try
to buy and sell across state boundary lines in the interstate market. This
turns the Commerce Clause on its head as Michael Greve has argued in
other contexts in his new book The Upside-Down Constitution.149
Justice Rutledge is simply wrong when he argues that “[t]he commerce
148. Prudential Ins. Co., 328 U.S. at 418–19.
149. GREVE, supra note 74.
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clause is in no sense a limitation upon the power of Congress over
interstate and foreign commerce.” The power to regulate commerce
among the States is a power to enhance free trade among the States and
not a power to establish forty-eight state cartels.
Under Justice Rutledge’s reading, Congress could tomorrow cartelize
the interstate market in groceries by giving the states carte blanch to
license and discriminate in taxation and by regulation against out-ofstate grocery stores. The result would be a grocery market with fifty
separate Whole Foods grocery stores—one for each state. Such a
cartelization of the market for groceries would send prices through the
roof and would result in a lower quality of service. This is exactly what
has happened with health insurance. The power to regulate commerce
among the states is not a power to create cartels or monopolies as I shall
explain in more detail below. It is a power to remove state barriers to
trade, not to create them.
Shortly after Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin was handed
down, Professor Noel Dowling tried to defend Justice Rutledge’s
opinion by arguing that:
Congress sometimes desires to give the states a helping hand by
consenting to the application of their laws. In that situation the whys and
wherefores of the states’ difficulties become of some interest, possibly
also of some consequence. What we are dealing with is a very fine phase
of federalism . . . . [O]n one theory or another, Congress can enable the
states to enforce laws which otherwise would not be acceptable in the
courts.150

Professor Dowling concedes that even in the New Deal era of
revolutionary constitutional change, the holding of Prudential Insurance
Co. v. Benjamin, that Congress could by statute overturn a Supreme
Court opinion, was a breathtaking assertion of power. As Professor
Dowling put it in summarizing the effects of the McCarran–Ferguson
Act:
Taken as a whole, nothing just like this had ever before been written on
the statute books. It includes a three-ply pronouncement: (a) declaration
of policy in favor of the continued regulation and taxation of the
insurance business by the several states; (b) denial of the applicability of
the doctrine of the ‘silence of Congress’ to upset such regulation or
taxation; (c) formulation of a substantive rule that in respect of regulation
and taxation the business of insurance ‘shall be subject to the laws’ of the

150. Noel T. Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power—Revised Version, 47 COLUM. L.
REV. 547, 555 (1947). Dowling was the original editor of what has now become the GUNTHER &
SULLIVAN casebook, which is cited at note 125.
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several states.151

Professor Dowling praises Justice Rutledge’s opinion in Prudential
Insurance Co. v. Benjamin for recognizing that “coordinated action
[between the nation] and the states” allows Congress and the States to
“achieve legislative consequences, particularly in the great fields of
regulating commerce and taxation, which, to some extent at least,
neither could accomplish in isolated exertion.” Surely, Professor
Dowling is right that only Congress and the states can together set up a
state insurance cartel, but why that is a good thing is harder to say!
Thus, Professor Dowling admits that “This conception of the power of
Congress troubles me [especially the assertion] that Congress can gain
any increment of power as a result of state action . . . .”152
Professor Dowling concludes that Justice Rutledge’s claim that when
the Supreme Court has previously upheld
the sustaining of Congress’ overriding action [in Dormant Commerce
Clause cases, there has been] something beyond correction of erroneous
factual judgment in deference to Congress’ presumably better-informed
view of the facts, and also beyond giving due deference to its conception
of the scope of its powers . . . .

Dowling ends by saying:
At this point it seemed almost as if Mr. Justice Rutledge were leading to a
mountain top from which he would point out the ‘something beyond’
which really went to the root of the matter. But after looking at this point
and at that on the broad landscape of his opinion, I was still not sure that
my vision had caught the ‘something beyond.’153

The reason that Professor Dowling cannot see in Justice Rutledge’s
opinion in Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin any reason for the
Supreme Court’s allowance of congressional overruling of Dormant
Commerce Clause opinions beyond Congress’ occasional better
information as to the facts is because there is no other reason for
allowing Congress to override the Dormant Commerce Clause.
Congressional overruling of the Dormant Commerce Clause to allow
the states to discriminate explicitly in taxation and regulation against
out-of-state insurers and in favor of in-state insurers is unconstitutional.
The commerce power is a power to make commerce regular by
eliminating tariffs and customs barriers at state lines and by enforcing
the public policy of the United States as to those goods, which are
travelling in commerce among the several states. The commerce power
cannot be used to overturn Supreme Court opinions any more than other
151. Dowling, supra note 150, at 556.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 557.
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congressional powers could be used to: 1) reopen past courts judgments;
2) to overturn Employment Division v. Smith; or 3) to overturn Miranda
v. Arizona. Congress lacks the enumerated power to override Supreme
Court decisions the way it can override presidential vetoes by a twothirds vote of both Houses. Congress also has no enumerated power to
create government cartels and monopolies outside the area of copyright
law and patents. It is to that subject that I will now turn.
IV. CONGRESS HAS NO ENUMERATED POWER TO CREATE MONOPOLIES
OTHER THAN COPYRIGHTS AND PATENTS
The Constitution addresses the subject of congressional power to
create monopolies in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8: “The Congress shall
have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”154
This Clause is the only place in which the Constitution confers a
power to create monopolies, oligopolies, or cartels on Congress, and
there is ample evidence that the Framers of the Constitution did not
mean for it to allow Congress to create monopolies, oligopolies, or
cartels in other contexts.
Prior to 1787, English Kings and Queens had frequently conferred
monopolies on their favorite courtiers by issuing them exclusive
corporate charters to conduct a certain kind of business or to do business
in a certain place. There was no general law of incorporation so if
someone, for example, wanted to get a corporate charter to be the
exclusive seller of playing cards in London or to form the Massachusetts
Bay Colony or to incorporate Dartmouth College, he had to go to the
King of England to get such a corporate charter.
The delegates to the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention debated
whether to give Congress the power to issue corporate charters (which
might have been monopolies), and they decided against giving Congress
that power. In 1787, the states had inherited the King’s power to issue
corporate charters, and they were unwilling to surrender this prerogative
to Congress. A proposal to give Congress the power to charter
corporations or monopolies would have aroused opposition from
financial interests already established in New York City or Philadelphia.
A proposal to give Congress the power to charter corporations for the
construction of canals was thus voted down by the Philadelphia
Convention by a vote of eight to three.155
154. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
155. 2 MAX FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 615–16 (Farrand ed.
1937).
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James Madison favored giving Congress the power to charter
corporations in 1787 and perhaps even the power to create some
monopolies, but he clearly realized that the Constitution of 1787, as
written and adopted, did not give this power to the federal government.
He thus opposed the constitutionality of the corporate charter for the
Bank of the United States. Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson agreed
with Congressman Madison that the Bank was unconstitutional.156
When President Andrew Jackson ultimately vetoed the renewal of the
Bank, in 1832, a principle reason given in his veto message for the veto
was that the bank had a monopoly corporate charter which, in Jackson’s
view, Congress had no power to issue. Jackson killed off the Bank in
the 1830’s, and it was not resurrected until Woodrow Wilson created the
Federal Reserve Board as an executive branch entity in 1913. Even
today, Corporate Law, as a field, is an area of state and not federal law,
and all major U.S. corporations—both for profit corporations and notfor-profit corporations—are chartered at the state level. The Founding
Era rejection of a congressional power to charter corporations or to
create monopolies, oligopolies, or cartels outside the context of patent
and copyright law could not be clearer.
As it happens, there is a long history in English and American
constitutional thought of opposition to government grants of monopoly
power outside the context of patents and copyrights. This history is
retold in a recent article, which I have co-authored with Larissa Price
Leibowitz entitled Monopolies and the Constitution: A History of Crony
Capitalism.157 This article is posted on SSRN and has been published in
36 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 983 (2013), and I will
therefore not repeat here what Ms. Leibowitz and I have already written
elsewhere, but I do want to mention a few highlights and will draw on it
extensively in the rest of this article.
The Framers of the U.S. Constitution inherited their distaste for
government grants of monopoly from England where such figures as
Queen Elizabeth I and King James I issued monopolies to their favorite
courtiers usually in exchange for money that they could not otherwise
get from Parliament. Queen Elizabeth had claimed that the legality of
her monopolies could only be adjudicated in the Court of Star chamber,
a fortress of royal power, but Parliament became so angry about her
grants of monopoly that Parliament came to the verge of passing a bill
that would have outlawed royal grants of monopoly forever. Queen
Elizabeth deflected this bill by agreeing to allow some of the least
popular monopolies she had granted as well as any new monopolies she

156. PAULSEN ET AL., supra note 114, at 68–71 (2010).
157. Calabresi & Price, supra note *.
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might grant to be adjudicated for legality in the common law courts. As
a result of this compromise, there emerged the famous decision of the
Court of King’s Bench in Darcy v. Allen, which is known popularly as
the Case of the Monopolies.158
Edward Darcy sued Thomas Allen for infringing on his monopoly
right and patent to be the exclusive producer, importer, and seller of
playing cards in England. The Court held that the monopoly was void at
common law. The opinion of the Court was reported by Sir Edward
Coke, and the Court said that:
All Trades . . . which avoid idleness . . . and exercise men and youths in
labor for the maintenance of them and their Families, and for the increase
of their livings, to serve the Queen if need be were profitable for the
Commonwealth; and therefore the grant to the Plaintiff to have the sole
making of them is against the Common Law, and the benefit and liberty
of the subject . . . .
The sole Trade of any Mechanical Artifice, or any other Monopoly is
not only a damage and prejudice to those who exercise the same Trade,
but also to all other subjects, for the end of all these Monopolies is for the
private gain of the Patentees; and although provisions and cautions be
added to moderate them; yet . . . it is meer folly to think there is any
measure in mischief or wickedness . . . .
[Monopoly leads] to the impoverishing of divers Artificers and
others, who before by labor of their hands in their Art or Trade had kept
themselves and their families, who now of necessity shall be constrained
to live in idlenesse and beggary.
[As a result of monopoly] the price of [a] commodity shall be raised,
for he who hath the sole selling of any commodity, may make the price as
he pleaseth . . . . That after a Monopoly [has been] granted, the
Commodity is not so good and merchantable as it was before; for the
patentee having the sole trade, regardeth only his private, and not the
publicke weale.159

Darcy v. Allen, “The Case of the Monopolies,” was a scathing rejection
of royal power to issue monopolies at the start of the Seventeenth
Century. The case quickly became a key bone of contention between
the Stuart Kings of England and Parliament.
King James I continued to issue monopolies notwithstanding the
decision of the Court of King’s Bench in Darcy v. Allen that royal
monopolies were illegal, and Sir Edward Coke who was by then Lord
Chief Justice of England and head of the Court of King’s Bench
continued to strike them down. James I eventually fired Coke from his
158. Darcy v. Allen, (1602) 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B.); 11 Co. Rep. 84b.
159. Id.
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judicial office both because of Coke’s opposition to royal monopolies
and because Coke had enjoined some newly created royal courts of
equity. Coke returned briefly to private life before being elected to the
House of Commons where he ultimately helped draft the famous act of
Parliament known as the Petition of Right.
James I called his third Parliament in 1621 after years of trying to
govern without Parliament, and the first issue on Parliament’s agenda
was passing a statute to outlaw royal monopolies. The Statute of
Monopolies finally passed the House of Commons and the House of
Lords in 1624. It said that:
[A]ll Monopolies, and all Commissions, graunts, licences, Charters and
lettres Patent heretofore made or graunted, or hereafter to be made or
graunted, to anie Person or Persons, Bodies Politique or Corporate
whatsoever, of or for the sole Buying, Selling, Making, Worcking, or
Using of anie Thing within this Realme, or the dominion of Wales . . . or
of any other Monopolies, or of Power, Libertie, or Facultie, to dispence
with any others, or to give lyccence or tolelracion to doe, use, or exercise
anie Thing . . . are altogeather contrary to the Laws of this Realme, and
soe are and shalbe utterly voyde and of none Effect, and in noe wise to be
put in Use or Execution.160

James I questioned Parliament’s authority to pass the Statute of
Monopolies, but he begrudgingly assented to it. Notwithstanding the
Statute, James I and his son Charles I continued to issue royal
monopolies enforceable in the Court of Star Chamber until the Long
Parliament abolished that Court, in 1641, at the start of the English Civil
War. Sir John Culpepper said of the royal monopolies of this time that:
They are a nest of wasps—a swarm of vermin which have overcrept the
land. Like the frogs of Egypt they have gotten possession of our
dwellings, and we have scarce a room free from them. They sup in our
cup; they dip in our dish; they sit by our fire. We find them in the dyefat, wash-bowl, and powdering-tub. They share with the butler in his
box. They will not bait us a pin. We may not buy our clothes without
their brokage. These are the leeches that have sucked the commonwealth
so hard that it is almost [heretical].161

The abolition of the royal monopolies became a key tenet of the
revolutionaries during the English Civil War along with the abolition of
the Court of Star Chamber, the protection of the right of habeas corpus,
and the freedom not to be taxed except by Parliament.
The English Civil War ended with the beheading of King Charles I
for among other things refusing to follow the law of the land. There

160. Statute of Monopolies, 21 Jam., c. 3 (1624).
161. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 47 (1872) (quoting Sir John Culpepper).
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followed a period of dictatorial rule by Oliver Cromwell and eventually,
in 1660, the Monarchy was restored under Charles’s son, King Charles
II, and the House of Lords, which had been abolished, was also restored.
The Court of Star Chamber, however, was not restored, in 1660, nor was
there any restoration of the claimed royal prerogative power to issue
monopolies. Charles II’s successor, James II, tried in his three-year
reign to reassert royal power to dispense with and suspend statutes like
the Statute of Monopolies, and the result was his overthrow in the
Glorious Revolution of 1688. Never again after 1641 did an English
King or Queen attempt to grant a monopoly.
From 1607 until 1776, Americans were Englishmen, and they
passionately believed they were entitled to all the ancient liberties and
freedoms of Magna Charta and of the common law including the right to
be free of monopolies. The Statute of Monopolies itself did not apply
outside of England and Wales, but in 1641 the Puritan Massachusetts
Bay colony provided in The Body of Liberties that “No monopolies shall
be granted or allowed amongst us, but of such new Inventions that are
profitable to the Countrie, and that for a short time.”162 The Puritan
Colony of Connecticut passed a similar law in 1672.163 William Penn,
the founder of Pennsylvania, wrote in 1687 in The Excellent Privilege of
Liberty & Property Being the Birth-Right of the Free-Born Subjects of
England, that “Generally all Monopolies are against this great [c]harter,
because they are against the Liberty and Freedom of the Subject, and
against the Law of the Land.”164
It is important here to recognize that the New England Puritans all
had favored Oliver Cromwell in the English Civil War, they had
opposed Charles I, and they had admired Sir Edward Coke as a hero
because he had stood up against the Stuart kings. The American
colonists repeatedly relied in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries
on Sir Edward Coke’s declaration in Dr. Bonham’s Case that the ancient
Constitution and the common law governed parliamentary acts, and they
argued against the legality of British regulations that were applied to
them in violation of the common law. When King James II revoked and
abrogated Massachusetts’s original colonial charter and attempted to
consolidate all the New England colonies in a so-called Dominion of
New England, this even “provoked an outspoken claim [of]

162. THE COLONIAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS 35 (Boston 1890).
163. Oren Bracha, The Commodification of Patents 1600–1836: How Patents Became Rights and
Why We Should Care, 38 LOY. L.A. REV. 177, 214 n.209 (2004).
164. Michael Conant, Antimonopoly Tradition Under the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments:
Slaughter-House Cases Re-Examined, 31 EMORY L.J. 785, 798 (1982) (quoting William Penn as
reprinted in A.E. DICK HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 621 (1968)).
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independence” and Bostonians were said to “hold forth a law book, &
“the Authority of the Lord Coke to Justifie their setting up for
themselves; pleading the possession of 60 years against the right of the
Crown.”165
Sir Edward Coke’s name and authority were also used by James Otis
in 1761 in Paxton’s Case when he challenged the legality under the
common law and English Constitution of the general warrants known as
writs of assistance. The Stamp Act of 1765 was challenged as having
“violated ‘Magna Carta and the natural rights of Englishmen, and
therefore[,] according to Lord Coke[, was] null and void.”166 Sam
Adams agreed that “whether Lord Coke has expressed it or not . . . an
act of parliament made against Magna Carta in violation of its essential
parties, is void.”167 Thomas Hutchinson, the royal Governor of
Massachusetts complained that the colonists take “advantage of a
maxim they find in Lord Coke that an Act of Parliament is ipso facto
void,”168 while John Adams started his argument that Parliament had no
authority over the colonies in “Novanglus” in 1774 with an argument
from Coke’s Institutes.169 As Thomas Barnes writes “Beg the question
as to what extent Coke fell in behind Citizen Sam [Adams]—scores of
others of our Founding Fathers had no doubt which side he was on and
none questioned the magnitude of the aid he gave them.”170
Colonial American enthusiasm about Sir Edward Coke and
opposition to monopolies was stoked by the English mercantile laws,
which granted English merchants monopolies in colonial trade ranging
from manufactured goods to all kinds of raw materials. These laws led
to the growth of black markets in the colonies, to widespread evasion of
taxes, and to increasingly intrusive British searches to catch tax
avoiders, which searches themselves infuriated the colonists all over
again. A Franklin D. Jones writes:
[T]he efforts of the English government, backed by English merchants
and manufacturers, to deny to the Americans the right to compete in
foreign markets and to secure the benefits of foreign competition was one
of the most potent causes of the American Revolution. The spirit of

165. Theodore F.T. Plucknett, Bonham’s Case and Judicial Review, 40 HARV. L. REV. 30, 62–63
(1926) reprinted in LAW, LIBERTY, AND PARLIAMENT: SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE WRITINGS OF SIR
EDWARD COKE 179 (Allen D. Boyer ed., Liberty Fund 2004).
166. Bernard H. Siegan, Protecting Economic Liberties, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 43, 50 (2003) (quoting
Robert E. Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 941, 970 (1990)).
167. Thomas G. Barnes, Introduction to Coke on Littleton, reprinted in LAW, LIBERTY, AND
PARLIAMENT: SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE WRITINGS OF SIR EDWARD COKE 65 (Allen D. Boyer ed.,
Liberty Fund 2004).
168. Plucknett, supra note 165, at 63.
169. Barnes, supra note 167, at 25.
170. Id.
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monopoly which had permeated English business life for centuries and
worked injury in so many ways now wrought irreparable harm to the
British Empire by bringing about the loss of invaluable dominions and
the irrevocable division of the English people.171

Consider here the facts of the Boston Tea Party, which was an act taken
not only against the British government but also against the East India
Company, which had a monopoly over tea importation into the
American colonies! Americans did not accept the British claim that
they could be taxed without representation in Parliament, and they also
deeply resented the East India Company’s monopoly. The Boston Tea
Party led quite directly to Parliament’s decision to close the port of
Boston and to adopt the so-called “Coercive Acts,” and these Acts led,
in turn, to the American Revolution. It is fair to say that the Framers of
the U.S Constitution, in 1787, were steeped in a tradition of hatred for
monopolies and of admiration for Sir Edward Coke.
The Philadelphia Convention that wrote the Constitution in 1787 gave
Congress the power to regulate trade or commerce and to create
monopolies only for limited periods of time for patents and copyrights.
There was a widespread understanding in 1787 that Congress should not
be able to use its commerce power either to charter corporations or to
create monopolies outside the patent and copyright context. As I
mentioned above, James Madison proposed during the Philadelphia
Convention to give the federal government the power to grant charters
of incorporation, but his proposal was voted down because, as Rufus
King of Massachusetts argued, it might lead to “mercantile monopolies”
as had happened in England before the American Revolution.172 George
Mason also objected to letting Congress have the power to grant
corporate charters because such a grant would lead to “monopolies of
every sort.”173
While monopolies outside the patent and copyright context were not
explicitly banned by the Constitution, it is quite clear that the
Constitution would not have been ratified had the Founding generation
understood that the Commerce Clause did in fact give Congress power
to create monopolies. Thus, George Mason, who was a leading AntiFederalist, refused to sign or support the Constitution because he was
worried that Congress might use its powers under the Commerce Clause
to regulate navigation and trade in favor of the eight northern and
eastern states by giving them monopolies in trade to the detriment of the
171. Franklin D. Jones, Historical Development of the Law of Business Competition, 36 YALE L.J.
42, 52 (1926).
172. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 638 (1985).
173. Daniel A. Crane, Lochnerian Antitrust, 1 N.Y.U.J. L. & LIBERTY 496, 506 (2005) (citing
DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 141 (1990)).
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five southern states.174
Thomas Jefferson also hated monopolies and wrote to his good friend
James Madison saying they should be banned. Jefferson said the
following in a letter to Madison after first reading the text of the new
Constitution:
I will now add what I do not like. First, the omission of a bill of rights
providing clearly and without the aid of sophisms for freedom of religion,
freedom of the press, protection against standing armies, restriction
against monopolies, the eternal and unremitting force of the habeas
corpus laws, and trials by jury . . . . Let me add that a bill of rights is
what the people are entitled to against every government on earth, general
or particular, and what no just government should refuse, or rest on
inference.175

Jefferson added that:
[It] is better to . . . abolish . . . Monopolies, in all cases, than not to do it in
any . . . .[S]aying there shall be no monopolies lessens the incitements to
ingenuity . . . but the benefit even of limited monopolies is too doubtful to
be opposed to that of their general suppression.176

Madison replied that:
With regard to Monopolies, they are justly classed among the greatest
nuisances in Government. But it is clear that as encouragements to
literary works and ingenious discoveries, they are not too valuable to be
wholly renounced? Would it not suffice to reserve in all cases a right to
the public to abolish the privilege at a price to be specified in the grant of
it?177

Jefferson wrote Madison again, after reviewing a draft of the Bill of
Rights on August 28, 1789 to say that he would have liked to see the
following provision added to the Bill of Rights:
Art. 9. Monopolies may be allowed to persons for their own productions
in literature and their own inventions in the arts, for a term not
exceeding―years but for no longer term, and for no other purpose.178

Jefferson so opposed monopolies that he also opposed the creation of
the federal Post Office at least after the fact of its creation and staffing
by his Federalist opponents.179
174. Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104 COLUM. L. REV.
272, 339 (2004) (quoting George Mason to this effect).
175. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787) (emphasis added).
176. Nachbar, supra note 174, at 340 (alteration in original).
177. 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 617–18 (1971)
(quoting a Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson on Oct. 17, 1788).
178. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 28, 1789).
179. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 6, 1796), available at http://press-
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The Anti-federalist Agrippa wrote in opposition to government grants
of monopoly180 and so did a self-styled “Son of Liberty”181 and the
Federal Farmer.182 Six states proposed including a provision banning
monopolies and special grants of privilege in the federal Constitution to
the federal Bill of Rights. These six states included: New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina, Virginia, and Rhode Island.
All of these proposed anti-monopoly amendments to the Constitution
came from the state ratifying conventions, but since the task of writing
the federal Bill of Rights in response to the requests for amendments from
the states fell to newly elected Congressman James Madison, an antimonopoly clause was omitted from the federal Bill of Rights. Madison
was stubborn, persistent, and successful in keeping an anti-monopoly
clause out of the Founders Constitution!183

Madison, however, personally recognized the evil of monopoly on
March 29, 1792 when he wrote:
That is not a just government, nor is property secure under it, where
arbitrary restrictions, exemptions, and monopolies deny to part of its
citizens that free use of their faculties, and free choice of their
occupations, which not only constitute their property in the general sense
of the word; but are the means of acquiring property strictly so called.184

So, why did James Madison, who was a friend of private property and of
markets, oppose adding an anti-monopoly clause to the Constitution or
the Bill of Rights?
Donald Lutz argues, and I think he proves conclusively, that the
rights James Madison put in the federal Bill of Rights were not drawn
from the English Bill of Rights of 1689 nor were they drawn from the
resolutions of the states when they ratified the Constitution with a
request for changes.185 Instead, Congressman James Madison drafted
the federal Bill of Rights so that it would look as much as possible like
the State Declarations and Bills of Rights that had been adopted between
1776 and 1789. Madison quite deliberately excluded from the federal
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_7s4.html.
180. James P. Philbin, The Political Economy of the Antifederalists, 11 J. OF LIBERTARIAN
STUDIES 79, 104 (1994) (citing HERBERT J. STORING, 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 80, 81, 104
(1981)).
181. Id. at 104–05.
182. Id. at 105.
183. Calabresi & Price, supra note *, at 34.
184. James W. Ely, Jr., To Pursue Any Lawful Trade or Avocation: The Evolution of
Unenumerated Economic Rights in the Nineteenth Century, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 917, 931 (quoting
Madison) (emphasis added).
185. Donald S. Lutz, The States and the U.S. Bill of Rights, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 251, 251–58 (1992);
Donald S. Lutz, The State Constitutional Pedigree of the U.S. Bill of Rights, PUBLIUS 22, 19–20, 27–29
(1992).
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Bill of Rights anything that would diminish Congress’s enumerated
powers including the commerce power.
Madison defanged the Anti-Federalist opposition to the Constitution
by giving the Anti-Federalist only the mere parchment barriers that he
had made fun of in The Federalist Papers and that were in the State
Bills of Rights.186 He added no new rights and took away from
Congress none of its enumerated power. Since at the time of the
Framing only two states out of thirteen had anti-monopoly clauses in
their state Bills of Rights, Madison may have felt no political need to
add such a clause to the federal Bill of Rights. He also had favored a
federal power to charter corporations at the Philadelphia Convention and
may have felt reluctant to add an anti-monopoly clause because of a
thought that corporate charters were sometimes a good thing, which they
certainly are both with for-profit corporations and with not-for-profit
corporations.
In any event, James Madison would be on my side in this article in
arguing that the federal power over commerce among the state is
exclusive since he is quoted as having said at the Philadelphia
Convention that: “Whether the States are now restrained from laying
tonnage duties depends on the extent of the power ‘to regulate
commerce.’ These terms are vague but seem to exclude this power of
the States.”187
James Madison would have been appalled by the McCarran–Ferguson
Act’s granting power to the states to discriminate against commerce
among the states. Madison, like John Marshall, thought that the
commerce power was an exclusive national power, and he would not
have thought that Congress could by statute delegate its commerce
clause powers to the states any more than Congress could have by
statute delegated its power to declare war to the states.
In the end, Thomas Jefferson, the Anti-Federalists, and the six state
ratifying conventions which asked for a federal Bill of Rights antimonopoly clause got their way because the federal government issued
no corporate charters or monopolies between the Founding and the Civil
War, and corporation law remains predominantly a state dominated area
of law right down to the present day. The new federal government
experimented on and off with a federally chartered Bank of the United
States, but the opponents of the Bank were loud and successful in
complaining about the unconstitutionality of the Bank, and the Bank
was killed by Andrew Jackson in the 1830’s for being an
unconstitutional monopoly that was neither necessary nor proper.

186. JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST NO. 38.
187. FARRAND, supra note 155, at 625.
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As I hope I have by now shown, opposition to monopoly and to
legislation that favored one class of people over another had deep roots
in the common law and was a fundamental principle of the Founders of
this country.188 Abe Salander and I argue in a forthcoming article in the
Florida Law Review,189 that aversion to such laws grew out of a
Lockean belief that the government existed for the purpose of protecting
private citizens’ natural rights.190 As John Locke put it himself, there
should be “one [R]ule for [R]ich and [P]oor, for the [F]avourite at Court,
and the Country Man at Plough.”191
Even before the federal Constitution was adopted, some states had
banned monopoly and class legislation in their state declarations of
rights or bills of rights.192 For example, Virginia’s Declaration of Rights
of 1776 banned the granting of “exclusive or separate [E]moluments or
[P]rivileges from the [C]ommunity, but in [C]onsideration of public
[S]ervices.”193 James Madison spoke for all the Founders when he said
that government should be “neutral between different parts of the
Society,” that “equality . . . ought to be the basis of every law,” and that
laws should not place “peculiar burdens” on some individuals or
“peculiar exemptions” on others.194
When later generations looked back on the Founding, they realized
that one of the Founders’ primary goals was to ban monopoly and class
legislation. As Representative Stephen L. Mayham said in 1870:

188. See Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 245 (1997) at 255–56; see Mark G. Yudof, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Sex
Discrimination: One Small Cheer for Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1366,
1372 (1990) (reviewing WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL
PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 1374–47 (Harv. Univ. Press 1988)).
189. Steven G. Calabresi & Abe Salander, Religion and the Equal Protection Clause: Why School
vouchers are Constitutionally Required, FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
190. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATIES OF GOVERNMENT §§ 123–24 (1764) (describing how “[t]he
great and chief end . . . of [M]ens uniting into [C]ommonwealths, and putting themselves under
[G]overnment, is the [P]reservation of their Property[P]roperty . . . their [L]ives, [L]iberties, and
[E]states”); SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND IN FOUR BOOKS,
NOTES SELECTED FROM THE EDITIONS OF ARCHIBOLD, CHRISTIAN, COLERIDGE, CHITTY, STEWART,
KERR, AND OTHERS, BARRON FIELD’S ANALYSIS, AND ADDITIONAL NOTES, AND A LIFE OF THE
AUTHOR BY GEORGE SHARSWOOD 124–25 (Phila., J.B. Lippincott Co. 1893) (“[T]he principal aim of
society is to protect individuals in the enjoyment of those absolute rights, which were vested in them by
the immutable laws of nature; but which could not be preserved in peace without . . . mutual
assistance.”).
191. LOCKE, supra note 190, § 142.
192. See Philip A. Hamburger, Equality and Diversity: The Eighteenth-Century Debate about
Equal Protection and Equal Civil Rights, 8 SUP. CT. REV. 295, 346 (1992).
193. VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF 1776 art. 4; Hamburger, supra note 192, at 346 n.124.
194. Saunders, supra note 188, at 256. Saunders also references the position of Jeffersonian
Republicans that government should provide “equal rights for all, special privileges for none,” as well as
the position of the Maine Whigs in the 1830s who advocated “[e]qual rights, equal laws, and equal
privileges for all classes of the community.” Id. (citations omitted).
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[W]hen this Constitution was adopted there was no sentiment that was
more universal in this nation than that of condemnation of all monopolies
and privileged classes. It was to rid themselves of enormous and
oppressive monopolies in the way of taxation and stamp duties that the
colonists had severed their connection with Great Britain; and it was in
the interest of equality and freedom of commerce, as well as freedom of
person, that this Government was founded. It would be a slander upon
the intelligence and patriotism of our fathers to say that this provision of
the Constitution, which is the only one under which this doctrine of
protection is claimed, intended it to foster monopolies and create
invidious distinctions of caste based upon business or wealth.195

Senator James W. Nye said much the same thing in 1866:
Our forefathers were made to chafe under monarchical insult and
imposition. They learned to know by experience that common protection
would never be awarded by privileged class. They entered into the
contest in defense of their natural and inalienable rights, and made the
cause of popular justice in the strength and ennobling feature of the
conflict.196

And Representative Owen Lovejoy said in 1860:
The object of government, according to the theory of the revered sages
who organized this Republic, is a very simple one, namely, to protect the
people in the peaceful enjoyment of their natural rights. In other words, it
is a mutual pledge, each to all and all to each, to secure this result;
designating the modes in which this end shall be achieved.
Consequently, pensions, bounties, peculiar privileges, class legislation,
and monopolies, sought from Government, is for one portion of the
people to become beggars or vampires of the rest. For classes thus to
beleaguer Government is as disgraceful to communities as it is to
197
individuals . . . .

As Thomas Cooley recognized over 100 years ago, the Constitution of
1787 banned monopoly and class legislation outside the context of
patents and copyrights.198
Cooley argued there were “implied
restrictions” on Congress’ taxing power in Article I Section 8,199 which
states, “The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes,

195. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 180 (1870) (Speech by Representative Stephen L.
Mayham discussing the merits of a tariff).
196. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1071 (1866) (Statement of Sen. James W. Nye) (Nye
also condemned the conduct of southern states: “In the recent attempt at revolution the intended
perpetuity of human bondage, added to the intended monopoly of wealth and political power, were the
mainspringings of the rebellion”).
197. CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 174–175 (1860) (Speech by Representative Owen
Lovejoy).
198. See THOMAS COOLEY, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1880).
199. Id. at 58–60, 97–98.
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Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all
Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States.”200 Cooley believed that “a tax can have no other basis than the
raising of a revenue for public purposes, and whatever governmental
exaction has not this basis is tyrannical and unlawful . . . . Where,
however, a tax is avowedly laid for a private purpose, it is illegal and
void.”201
Cooley argued that these same “implied restrictions” applied to all of
Congress’s Article I, Section 8 powers, and not just to the taxing
power202: “Every legislative body is to make laws for the public good,
and not for the benefit of individuals; and it is to make them aided by
the light of those general principles which lie at the foundation of
representative [institutions].”203 Cooley thus argued that the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment embodied this public
purpose doctrine.204 Tying together congressional power to tax and take
property, Cooley explained that:
Taxation takes property from the citizen for the public use, but it does so
under general rules of apportionment and uniformity, so that each citizen
is supposed to contribute only his fair share to the expenses of
government, and to be compensated for doing so in the benefits which the
government brings him.205

Cooley argued that the federal Constitution of 1787 banned monopolies.
He argued that: “exclusive privileges are to some extent invidious and
very justly obnoxious, and it is not reasonable to suppose that the State
would grant them, except when some important public purpose or some
necessary public convenience cannot be accomplished or provided
without making the grant exclusive.”206
Several other constitutional provisions further support the view that
the federal Constitution of 1787 banned monopolies and class
legislation. The Preamble of the Constitution declares, for example, that
the purpose, of the document is to “provide for the common defence”
and to “promote the general Welfare.”207 In addition, the Full Faith and
200. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
201. COOLEY, supra note 198, at 57–58.
202. Cooley’s assertion is bolstered by some of the language in Article I Section 8, which allows
Congress “[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies throughout the United States.” U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 4 (emphasis added).
203. See id. at 97–98.
204. Id. at 332.
205. Id. at 333.
206. Id. at 306. Cooley does not specify which constitutional provision bars the states from
granting monopolies, but he seemed to find the prohibition in the Contracts Clause.
207. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added).
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Credit Clause only allows Congress to pass “general laws” when it
legislates to enforce the Clause.208 The Establishment Clause prevented
the government from granting a special monopoly to one religion. The
principle that federal laws should be general and should not favor one
class over another by giving it monopoly privileges is made explicit in:
1) the requirement that “all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States;”209 2) the requirement that all federal laws
on naturalization be uniform;210 3) the requirement that all federal laws
on bankruptcy shall also be uniform;211 and 4) the requirement that no
preference “be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the
Ports of one State over those of another;”212 Special grants of privilege
are banned in the Title of Nobility Clause,213 while the imposition of
special burdens on individuals is banned at both the federal and the state
level by the bans on bills of attainder and ex post facto laws.214
It is not plausible read a Constitution that requires that taxes,
naturalization laws, and bankruptcy laws all be uniform, and, which
forbids giving preferences to ports of one state over another, as giving
Congress the power to regulate commerce among the states in a way that
is not uniform. And yet by delegating to the fifty states total power to
license health insurance within each state, Congress ensures as a matter
of federal statutory law that health insurance will not be regulated in a
way that is uniform throughout the United States.
Congress cannot use its commerce power in such a non-uniform way
nor can it use any of its enumerated powers to create monopolies. The
anti-monopoly tradition that began in England in The Case of
Monopolies and The Statute of Monopolies and which gathered force in
the original thirteen colonies suggests that Congress does not have the
power to pass the McCarran–Ferguson Act. Congress cannot turn over
the regulation of commerce among the states as to federal health
insurance that people must buy to a non-uniform, monopoly set of
licensed state health insurance providers.
In closing on this subject, consider the words of Andrew Jackson’s
message vetoing the bill that would have renewed the corporate charter
of the Bank of the United States—words that were written with the
208. Id. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect
thereof.”).
209. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
210. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
211. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
212. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 6.
213. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
214. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
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assistance of future Supreme Court Chief Justice Roger B. Taney:
Every act of Congress, therefore, which attempts by grants of monopolies
or sale of exclusive privileges for a limited time, or a time without limit,
to restrict or extinguish its own discretion in the choice of means to
execute its delegated powers is equivalent to a legislative amendment of
the Constitution, and palpably unconstitutional.215

Jackson went on to argue that the Bank of the United States, as a
monopoly, violated the core principle of what we would today call the
equal protection of the laws:
Many of our rich men have not been content with equal protection and
equal benefits, but have besought us to make them richer by act of
Congress. By attempting to gratify their desires we have in the results of
our legislation arrayed . . . interest against interest, and man against man,
in a fearful commotion which threatens to shake the foundations of our
Union . . . . If we can not at once, in justice to interests vested under
improvident legislation, make our Government what it ought to be, we
can at least take a stand against all new grants of monopolies and
exclusive privileges, against any prostitution of our Government to the
advancement of the few at the expense of the many . . . .216

Rather than accede to the rich men’s request, the government should
“confine itself to equal protection, and, as Heaven does its rains, shower
its favors alike on the high and the low, the rich and the poor.”217
People should “take a stand against all new grants of monopolies and
exclusive privileges, against the prostitution of our Government to the
advancement of the few at the expense of the many.”218
Jackson’s hatred of monopolies was not unique to him, however, as I
hope I have shown by now. It had its roots deep in the thinking of Sir
Edward Coke and of Thomas Jefferson, the very man who founded the
Democratic Party, which under Jefferson’s and later Jackson’s
leadership received a majority of the popular vote in every presidential
election held from 1800 through 1856. Jefferson’s and Jackson’s antimonopoly party won thirteen out of fifteen presidential elections during
those fifty-six years. The Jacksonians lost in 1840 to William Henry
Harrison who died after only one month in office, and whose term was
filled out by a Jacksonian Democrat, John Tyler, who twice vetoed bills
to recharter the Bank of the United States. Tyler’s vetoes were issued
on Jacksonian grounds. The only other time that the Jacksonians lost
the presidency was in 1848 and then, again, the man they lost to—
215. Andrew Jackson, U.S. President, Address to the Senate Vetoing the Bank of the United
States (July 10, 1832), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/ajveto01.asp.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
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Zachary Taylor—died in office, this time after two years of service.
From the Age of Jefferson to the Age of Lincoln, the Commerce Power
was emphatically read NOT to allow Congress to create government
granted monopolies. As we will see shortly, Abraham Lincoln’s heirs—
the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment—hated government grants of
monopoly as well. The Commerce Clause did not as an original matter
allow the federal government to grant monopolies outside the context of
issuing patents and copyrights.
V. THE MCCARRAN–FERGUSON ACT VIOLATES THE PRIVILEGES AND
IMMUNITIES CLAUSE
The McCarran–Ferguson Act not only exceeds Congress’s
enumerated powers under the Constitution but it also violates the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. That Clause
says that: “The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges
and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”219 The Clause
descends from a similar provision in the Articles of Confederation,
which said that:
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse
among the people of the different States in this [u]nion, the free
inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives
from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of
free citizens in the several States.220

What these two Privileges and Immunities Clauses do is to
constitutionalize the traditional rights that Englishmen had always had
under the common law, Magna Carta, and the so-called ancient
constitution at least as against discriminatory laws.221 Sir Edward Coke
219. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
220. ART. OF CONF. art VI, § 1.
221. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV and the Privileges or Immunities Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment have been the subject of much recent scholarly attention. Modern
scholarship on the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause began with John Harrison,
Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385 (1992), which argued that the
Clause was an anti-discrimination guarantee and not a font of substantive due process individual rights.
Phillip Hamburger reaches the same conclusion in Privileges or Immunities, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 61
(2011). Akhil Reed Amar and Randy Barnett read the Clause as protecting both against discrimination
and as conferring unenumerated individual rights. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN
CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 157 (2012); RANDY E. BARNETT,
RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 62–65 (2004). Kurt Lash argues
in a series of three law review articles, which he is turning into a book, that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause protects both against discrimination and that it also protects enumerated but not unenumerated
individual rights. Kurt Lash, The Constitutional Referendum of 1866: Andrew Johnson and the Original
Meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause (2012); Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, Part I: “Privileges and Immunities” as an Antebellum Term of Art, 98 GEO. L. J.
1241 (2010); Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part II: John Bingham
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said that government grants of monopoly violated the liberty guaranteed
to all Englishmen by the common law, and the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States were first and foremost their
common law rights.
The original meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV is embodied in Justice Bushrod Washington’s famous opinion
while riding circuit in 1823—an opinion that became gospel to the
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities
Clause. Justice Washington said:
The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens [of the
United States]? We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to
those privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental;
which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and which
have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which
compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent,
and sovereign. What these fundamental principles are, it would perhaps
be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may, however, be all
comprehended under the following general heads: Protection by the
government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire
and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness
and safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may
justly prescribe for the general good of the whole.
The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any
other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or
otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute
and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state; to take, hold
and dispose of property, either real or personal; and an exemption from
higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the state;
may be mentioned as some of the particular privileges and immunities of
citizens, which are clearly embraced by the general description of
privileges deemed to be fundamental: to which may be added, the elective
franchise, as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the
state in which it is to be exercised. These, and many others which might

and the Second Draft of the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 GEO. L. J. 329 (2011). Robert Natelson argues
in The Original Meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 43 GA. L. REV. 1117 (2009) for the
John Harrison and Phillip Hamburger interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
IV, Section 2. My view of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 and of the
similarly worded clause in the Fourteenth Amendment is that they protect: 1) against laws that
discriminate on the basis of class or caste or that confer monopolies and that are not just laws enacted
for the good of the whole people; and that 2) they protect both enumerated individual rights and
unenumerated individual rights that are deeply rooted in history and tradition subject always to the
caveat that the states can override such rights if they pass a just law that is enacted for the general good
of the whole people. This reading grows out of Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823),
which for better or worse is the foundational case. Philip Hamburger makes a good argument in his law
review article cited above that Justice Washington construed the Article IV, Section 2 Clause too
narrowly, but I think it is too late in our constitutional history to take that argument very far.
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be mentioned, are, strictly speaking, privileges and immunities, and the
enjoyment of them by the citizens of each state, in every other state, was
manifestly calculated (to use the expressions of the preamble of the
corresponding provision in the old articles of confederation) ‘the better to
secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the
people of the different states of the Union.222

Justice Washington’s dictum clearly on its face recognizes federal
constitutional protection for a very broad set of economic rights
including the right to choose a trade or profession, and it clearly does
not allow for government creation of monopolies. Economic liberties
that are deeply rooted in American and English history and tradition can
only be taken away “subject nevertheless to such restraints as the
government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole.” A
monopoly is by definition “unjust,” and it is not enacted to pursue “the
general good of the whole [people].”
Justice Washington’s opinion in Corfield v. Coryell thus confirms that
Congress would violate Article IV, Section 2 if it were to set up
monopolies, oligopolies, or cartels at the State level. Congress can no
more pass a law that violates Article IV, Section 2 then it can pass a law
that violates the Contracts Clause of Article I, Section 10. No one
would contend that Congress could use its Commerce Clause and
Necessary and Proper Clause powers to authorize the states to violate
the Contracts Clause. So why should anyone think that Congress can
use its enumerated powers to authorize the states to abridge the
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several states?
Did the words “Privileges and Immunities” mean at the Founding that
citizens had a right to be free of government grants of monopoly or
special privilege? Consider the fact, as Larissa Price and I point out in
our article on Monopolies and the Constitution, that eight states at the
time of the Founding had Privileges and Immunities Clauses. Those
states included: Connecticut, Massachusetts, North Carolina, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Virginia.223 For
example, Massachusetts’s constitution of 1780 provided that “[n]o
subject shall be . . . deprived of his property, immunities, or
privileges . . . but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the
land.”224 Furthermore, “No man, nor corporation, or association of men,
have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive
privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what arises from

222. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (emphasis added).
223. See Steven G. Calabresi et al., State Bills of Rights in 1787 and 1791: What Individual Rights
Are Really Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1451, 1528 (2012).
224. MASS. CONST. OF 1780, pt. 1, art. XII.
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the consideration of services rendered to the public.”225 North
Carolina’s constitution if 1776, which also banned monopolies, said that
“[N]o [m]an, or set of [m]en are [entitled] to exclusive or separate
[e]moluments or [p]rivileges from the community, but in consideration
of public services.”226 Virginia’s Constitution of 1776 stated “That no
man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or
privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services;
which nor being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate,
legislator or judge, to be hereditary.”227 These clauses all clearly ban
government grants of monopoly on their face.
Larissa Price and I show in Monopolies and the Constitution that
from the time of the American Founding to the Age of Andrew Jackson
up through the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, in 1868, a
central constitutional concern was a ban on class legislation or
government monopoly. This ban was usually expressed in language that
banned giving some privileges or immunities to a favored citizen or
class of citizens while giving lesser privileges or immunities to the
citizenry as a whole. Eventually, the Jacksonian hatred of monopoly,
which echoed Thomas Jefferson the founder of Jackson’s political party,
came to be embraced by Reconstruction Republicans! They argued that
the Slave Power had an unconstitutional monopoly on the labor of
slaves and after 1865 on the labor of newly freed African-Americans.
The Republicans said the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were needed to end
the Slave Power monopoly.
Consider the words of Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner—a
leader of Reconstruction:
The Rebellion began in two assumptions . . . first, the sovereignty of the
States, with the pretended right of secession; and, secondly, the
superiority of the white race, with the pretended right of Caste, Oligarchy,
and Monopoly, on account of color . . . . The second showed itself at the
beginning, when South Carolina alone among the thirteen States allowed
her Constitution to be degraded by an exclusion on account of
color . . . .228

In fact, for Sumner, slavery was a system of caste and of monopoly:
A Caste cannot exist except in defiance of the first principles of
Christianity and the first principles of a Republic. It is Heathenism in
religion and tyranny in government. The Brahmins and the Sudras in

225.
226.
227.
228.

MASS. CONST. OF 1780, art. VI.
N.C. CONST. OF 1776, art. III.
VA. CONST. OF 1776, § 4.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 686 (1866) (Statement of Senator Charles Sumner).
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India, from generation to generation, have been separated, as the two
races are now separated in these States. If a Sudra presumed to sit on a
Brahmin’s carpet, he was punished with banishment. But our recent
rebels undertake to play the part of the Bramhins, and exclude citizens,
with better title than themselves, from essential rights, simply on the
ground of Caste, which, according to its Portuguese origin, casta, is only
another term for race.229

In 1866, Sumner proposed a bill in the Senate that would have banned
all systems of caste, class, and monopoly at the state level. The
language he used for the proposed statute is striking:
[T]here shall be no [O]ligarchy, [A]ristocracy, [C]aste, or [M]onopoly
invested with peculiar privileges and powers, and there shall be no denial
of rights, civil or political, on account of color or race anywhere within
the limits of the United States or the jurisdiction thereof; but all persons
therein shall be equal before the law.230

Senator Charles Sumner clearly understood the possession of special
privileges and immunities as being a forbidden possession of a
government monopoly.
Thomas Jefferson, George Mason, Agrippa, the Son of Liberty, and
all the Anti-Federalists were wrong to fear that the Commerce Clause
would inevitably lead to federal governmental grants of monopoly. It
did not do so. In fact, the anti-monopoly principle was so important to
Americans that it was eventually written into the Fourteenth
Amendment to apply against the states as well as being present in the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. The antimonopoly principle is deeply rooted in English and American
constitutional history and tradition, and Congress cannot therefore
legalize state healthcare monopolies or oligopolies using its Commerce
Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause powers.
At this point, a reader is bound to object that Congress has for a long
time issued licenses to shippers, broadcasters, and many other
commercial actors as well. It is well established that Congress can
regulate commercial economic actors by licensing them and, if so,
Congress must have the power to let the states license commercial
health insurers in-state and out-of-state as well. The conclusion here
does not follow from the premise. Congress cannot necessarily farm out
to the states something that it could do itself.
Congress does have the power under the Constitution to pass laws
itself that impair the obligation of contracts, but the Constitution bans
the states from passing such laws. Congress cannot delegate its power

229. Id. at 683.
230. Id. at 1287.
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to pass laws impairing the obligation of contracts to the states any more
than it can delegate its power to license the buying and selling of health
insurance. Nor can Congress allow the states to discriminate against
out-of-state insurers as compared to in-state insurers without violating
along the way Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section
2.
The Privileges and Immunities Clause is first and foremost a ban on
state discrimination against citizens from other states. As James
Madison himself explained in The Federalist No. 42:
Those who come under the denomination of free inhabitants of a State,
although not citizens of such State, are entitled in every other State, to all
the privileges of free citizens of the latter; that is to greater privileges than
they may be entitled in their own State.231

Joseph Story said much the same thing in 1833:
It is obvious, that, if the citizens of each state were to be deemed aliens to
each other, they could not take, or hold real estate, or other privileges,
except as aliens. The intention of this clause was to confer on them, if
one may say, a general citizenship; and to communicate all the privileges
and immunities, which the citizens of the same state would be entitled to
under the like circumstances.232

The U.S. Supreme Court finally acknowledged that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV was an anti-discrimination clause in the
following famous passage from Paul v. Virginia:
It was undoubtedly the object of the clause in question to place the
citizens of each [s]tate upon the same footing with citizens of other
[s]tates so far as the advantages resulting from citizenship in those States
are concerned. It relieves them from the disabilities of alienage in other
States; it gives them the right of free ingress into other States and egress
from them; it ensures to them in other States the same freedom possessed
by the citizens of those States in the acquisition and enjoyment of
property and in the pursuit of happiness; and it secures to them in other
States the equal protection of their laws.233

The Privileges and Immunities Clause bans discrimination by a state
against an out-of-state citizen. This is clear beyond any shadow of a
doubt.
The Supreme Court did hold, however, in Paul v. Virginia that a
corporation is not a citizen within the meaning of Article IV, Section 2
(as well as holding that insurance contracts were not covered by the
Commerce Clause). Since most health insurers are corporations and
231. JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (1788).
232. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1800 (1833).
233. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 180 (1868).
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since corporations are not protected from discrimination for being outof-state entities, under Paul v. Virginia, it could be argued that the
McCarran–Ferguson Act is constitutional because the Article IV ban on
discrimination against out-of-staters does not apply to health insurance
corporations.
I reject this argument for three reasons. First, the McCarran–
Ferguson Act is overbroad because on its face it allows the states to
license insurance policies issued by an individual as well as those issued
by a corporation. Congress clearly cannot permit the states to
discriminate against out-of-state individuals without violating the
Privileges and Immunities Clause. This suggests the McCarran–
Ferguson Act, as combined with the health care mandate, is in part
unconstitutional and should be struck down. The Supreme Court should
make Congress re-pass the McCarran–Ferguson Act, in a form where it
applies only to corporations then, if that is really what Congress wants
to do.
Second, the McCarran–Ferguson Act is also highly suspect on
enumerated powers and Dormant Commerce Clause grounds so surely
this is an area where the Supreme Court might legitimately want to ask
Congress to take a “second look” at the state of the law. Judge Guido
Calabresi famously argued in A Common Law for the Age of Statutes
that judges should force Congress to take a second look at old laws that
are constitutionally dubious.234 The McCarran–Ferguson Act is, in my
opinion, an old statute as to which Congress ought to be forced to take a
second look. The Act enhances the formation of state cartels,
oligopolies, and monopolies, and it thus diminishes consumer welfare.
There is nothing in the Constitution that empowers Congress to create
such state level cartels, oligopolies, and monopolies, and there is a lot of
history that suggests that Congress lacks this power.
Third, and finally, the holding of Paul v. Virginia that corporations
are not citizens of the United States is in flat contradiction to the
Supreme Court case law construing Article III, Section 2 as saying that
corporations are citizens for purposes of being able to sue in the federal
courts diversity jurisdiction.235 One or the other of these two lines of
case law must be wrong. It is inconceivable that a corporation could be
a citizen of the United States for purposes of suing in federal court but
not be a citizen under Article IV, Section 2.
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the Supreme
Court recently held that corporations have extensive First Amendment
rights—a position with which I agree. Corporations should be treated as
234. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
235. See, e.g., Hertz v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010) (continuing to recognize corporations as being
citizens of the United States for purposes of the diversity jurisdiction).
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persons entitled not only to First Amendment privileges but also to
Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment purposes as well. The New York
Times and the University of Cincinnati are both corporations, and they
both have, in my opinion, constitutional rights. But, if this is really the
case, why on earth would we conclude that corporations have a right to
speak but not a right to compete on a level playing field in commerce
among the states?
The holding of Paul v. Virginia that corporations are not citizens
under Article IV, Section 2 is a catastrophe from a policy perspective
because it allows in-state corporations to use state law to protect
themselves from out-of-state competition subject however to the
constraints of the Dormant Commerce Clause. In areas like insurance,
where Congress has somehow purported to “override” the Dormant
Commerce Clause by statute, the costs are immense. It is quite simply
absurd to say that corporations have free speech rights and the right to
sue in federal court but no right to compete on an even playing field in
interstate commerce.
A Supreme Court that continues to draw such a line is inadvertently
fostering a cartel and crony capitalism. Now that the Court has held in
NFIB v. Sebelius that Congress can use its taxing power to compel us to
purchase health insurance, the Supreme Court has a special
responsibility to go back and reconsider, in the health insurance context
only, decisions like Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin and Western
& Southern Life Insurance Co. v. California.236 If the Supreme Court is
going to allow Congress to tax us for not buying health insurance, it
ought at least to stop Congress from making us pay money to buy a
service from fifty state licensed health insurance cartels, oligopolies, and
monopolies.
VI. CONCLUSION
I want to end with one additional observation with which I think
Chief Justice Taft would have sympathized. Congress may have broad
power to delegate to the executive and judicial branches of the federal
government, but there are real limits on congressional power to delegate
to the states or to private parties. In Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, the Supreme Court held that the National Industrial Recovery
Act unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to private economic
actors in an effort to cartelize the whole U.S. economy.237 I think this
unanimous decision is one of the great, unsung triumphs of American
236. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946); 456 W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd.
of Equalization of Cal., 451 U.S. 648 (1981).
237. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
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constitutional law and that it saved us from an American version of
Mussolini’s fascism. It is very, very dangerous to allow Congress to
delegate federal power to private persons. Such persons are not
accountable to the voters and to Congress in the way that executive and
judicial branch personnel are. As the Supreme Court found in Larkin v.
Grendel’s Den, it is even constitutionally problematic to allow a state or
local government to delegate to a private church a veto over a nearby
restaurant’s ability to obtain a liquor license.238
When Congress delegates its Commerce Clause power to the States—
a power that is almost certainly exclusive in some respects—it violates
the text of the Constitution just as surely as it would if it delegated its
power to declare war to the states. There are fifty states today, not
thirteen as at the founding, and as a result there are countless more
external effects of state legislation on other states as well as many more
state line crossings.239 The fifty states simply cannot be trusted to
regulate a huge national service industry on which we spend one-sixth
of our GDP as a nation if the states have carte blanche to discriminate in
licensing against out-of-state health insurers.
By upholding the healthcare mandate, the Supreme Court has ruled
that all of us MUST now buy the services of the fifty state health
insurance cartels, oligopolies, and monopolies. It is incumbent on the
Supreme Court to make sure that American consumers are not turned
into the victims of crony capitalism by a weird confluence of its bizarre
Dormant Commerce Clause and Privileges and Immunities Clause
doctrines. NFIB v. Sebelius obligates the Supreme Court to take a
second look in the healthcare context at decisions like Prudential
Insurance Co. v. Benjamin; Western & Southern Life Insurance Co. v.
California; and even Paul v. Virginia.240 In A Common Law for the Age
of Statutes, Judge Guido Calabresi argued for second look judicial
review when a set of statutes passed at very different times in our
history and coupled with old case law produce a result we doubt
Congress would legislate today. It is time for the Supreme Court to put
an end to Crony Capitalism in the health insurance industry.

238. Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
239. Steven G. Calabresi & Nicholas Terrell, The Number of States and the Economics of
American Federalism, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2011).
240. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946); 456 W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd.
of Equalization of Cali., 451 U.S. 648 (1981); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1869).
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